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Toimet ilmastonmuutoksen hillitsemiseksi ja siihen sopeutumiseksi ovat Euroopan unionin (EU) politiikan keskiössä. EU:n ilmasto- 
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mukaisen kielletyn valtiontuen arviointi on linjassa jäsenvaltioita sitovien velvoitteiden kanssa. Valtiontukisääntelyn tulisi tarjota jä-
senvaltioiden viranomaisille tarkoituksenmukaiset puitteet, jotka tukevat ympäristötavoitteiden saavuttamista tehokkaalla tavalla. 
Tämä tutkielma käsittelee ympäristötavoitteiden asemaa SEUT 107(1) artiklan mukaisen kielletyn verotuen arvioinnissa ja valtiontu-
kea valikoivan ympäristöverotuksen ja ympäristöverojen alennuksen tai vapautuksen muodossa.  
 
Tutkielman viitekehys on siten EU:n vero- ympäristö- ja valtiontukipolitiikan risteyskohdassa. Verotus kuuluu lähtökohtaisesti jäsen-
valtioiden yksinomaiseen toimivaltaan, jota on kuitenkin käytettävä EU:n perussopimusten mukaisesti. Kilpailusääntöjen vahvistami-
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AG Advocate General 
 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union, comprising of both the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and the General Court 
 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
 
EEAG Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-
2020 
 
ETD Directive 2003/96/EC on the taxation of energy products and electricity 
 
ETS Emissions Trading System  
 
EU European Union 
 
GBER Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid com-
patible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty  
 
GC General Court 
 
i.e.  For example 
 
MBI Market-based Instruments 
 
OJ Official Journal 
 
PPP Polluter Pays Principle 
 
SGEI Services of General Economic Interest 
 
TEU Treaty on the European Union 
 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The aim of mitigating climate change and adopting to its detrimental effects is in the frontline 
of the politics of the European Union (EU). Therefore, the EU has introduced legislation 
along with several policy commitments which oblige both the EU and the Member States to 
address the ongoing climate crisis by adhering to binding emissions reduction targets, in 
particular those laid down in the 2030 climate and energy framework.1 The framework is 
enforced by legislation such as the Effort Sharing Regulation 2018/842/EU and Regulation 
2018/1999/EU, according to which Member States must develop National Energy and Cli-
mate Plans and contribute to the target of at least a 40 % domestic reduction in economy-
wide greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 19902, although it is expected that the 
Commission presents a plan to increase the targets to 50% or even 55%.3 Furthermore, the 
objective of the European Green Deal, the priority of the von der Leyen Commission, is to 
create “a […] competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases 
in 2050.4” The attainment of these ambitious goals necessitates the reconciliation of long-
term policy goals with the prevailing political realities as well as balancing between the of-
ten-opposing objectives of environmental, social, fiscal and economic policies. It is undis-
puted that the transition to a green economy requires State intervention both in the form of 
regulation and market-based instruments (MBI) such as environmental taxes.5  
 
In fact, State spending has been on the increase during the recent years, and about 55% of 
all spending (66.5 billion EUR) was allocated to environmental protection and energy sav-
ings in year 2018.6 Hence, State aid law, which determines the justified means of State in-
tervention in the normal functioning of the market, plays a paramount role in the field of 
environmental policy. The main rule of State aid control is that measures fulfilling the cu-
mulative criteria laid down in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
 
1 Communication from the Commission, A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 
to 2030, COM(2014) 15 final. See also EEAG recital 4. 
2 See, inter alia, Regulation 2018/1999/EU, recital 7, Article 1(a) and 15(2), Regulation 2018/842/EU, recit-
als 1-3, Article 1 and 4.  
3 Communication from the Commission, The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final, p. 4.  
4 Ibid, p. 2.  
5 EEA Report No 17/2016, Environmental taxation and EU environmental policies, 2016, p. 5, 36. 
6 State Aid Scoreboard 2019, p. 11-13, 38. 
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European Union (TFEU) are in principle prohibited, as they are considered to have distortive 
effects on competition and trade between the Member States. However, such measures may 
be exempted from the prohibition if they are considered compatible with the internal market 
under Article 107(2) or Article 107(3) TFEU.  
 
The focus of this dissertation is in the assessment of the cumulative criteria in the case of 
environmental taxes and exemptions therefrom with the aim of clarifying when they may 
fall outside the scope of State aid control under Article 107(1) TFEU and thus also the noti-
fication obligation laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU. The objective is to study the standing 
of environmental objectives in the interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Commission. One important issue with this 
respect is the question of whether environmental considerations should be better integrated 
into the assessment existence of State aid in the light of the requirements stemming from EU 
law and policy as well as the case-law of the CJEU. This question is also linked with the 
assessment of the desired scope of State aid control and whether it allows the Member States 
to pursue their emission reduction targets in a sufficiently efficient manner. Answering these 
questions requires studying the compatibility of the three frameworks – fiscal, environmental 
and State aid law – and the leeway Member States enjoy in the design of fiscal measures 
pursuing an environmental objective. Several legal scholars have discussed the need for an 
adjustment of the current State aid regime to better support the attainment of the EU's energy 
and climate change objectives, and discussion on alternative interpretations of the notion of 
prohibited State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU with this respect will be discussed through-
out this dissertation.  
 
The notion of material selectivity will be discussed in detail as it raises several interpretative 
difficulties and issues of legal uncertainty with respect to the assessment of fiscal aid 
measures.7 As State aid in the form of tax measures is widely utilised by the Member States 
for the pursuit of public policy objectives such as those relating to the environment, the 
notion of State aid has arguably been stretched in order to ensure that they remain subject to 
State aid control.8 The focus on the permissibility of environmental taxes and exemptions 
therefrom is not only topical both also interesting from an academic point due to the incon-
sistencies in interpretation and the fact that the reconciliation of EU-wide State aid control 
 
7 See, for instance, Merola, 2016, p. 533. 
8 Ibid, p. 534, 356. 
3 
  
and national fiscal policies of the Member States links with the division of competences 
between EU and the Member States.9 
 
1.2. Research questions and delimitations 
 
As mentioned above, this dissertation studies the categorisation national fiscal measures as 
State aid under the cumulative criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU and aims to clarify 
when State intervention may and perhaps should fall outside State aid control when it pur-
sues an environmental objective. By doing so, it aims at systemising the prevailing case-law 
of the CJEU and identifying the types of national fiscal measures aimed at the protection of 
the environment which may escape State aid control or, alternatively, may be considered 
compatible with the internal market regardless of being classified as prohibited State aid 
under Article 107(1) TFEU. However, the compatibility assessment under Article 107(3) 
TFEU will not be subject to a throughout review, as the guidance for its application is rela-
tively detailed and will soon be updated.10 A review of EU secondary legislation related to 
environmental taxation11 will not be undertaken, either.  
 
In addition to providing a general overview of the standing of environmental objectives in 
State aid judgements, a more detailed study on the utilisation of aid in the field of environ-
mental taxation will be undertaken. Fiscal State aid may be the result of an asymmetrical 
definition or application of an environmental tax, as imposing a tax on some undertakings 
only may provide a selective advantage to undertakings which are excluded from its scope 
although being in a comparable factual and legal situation in the light of the objective pur-
sued. Furthermore, State aid may be present in the form of reductions in or exemptions from 
environmental taxes, which by their nature provide an advantage to certain undertakings by 
relieving from the applicable tax. The focus is on the interpretation of the Treaty articles, 
although the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy  2014-2020 
(EEAG) will also be considered as they play a significant role by identifying a series of 
 
9 See, for instance, Peters, 2019. 
10 In this regard, see Communication from the Commission concerning the prolongation and the amendments 
of, inter alia, the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020, OJ C 224, 
8.7.2020, p. 2–4. 
11 Such as Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and Directive 
2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax. 
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environmental measures compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU.12  
 
Another question of this dissertation is, as explained above, whether the current State aid 
regime should be adjusted to better address the changes in the field of environmental law 
and policy. In this connection, especially the role of integration principle laid down in Article 
11 TFEU in the assessment of the cumulative criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU will be dis-
cussed. Finally, this dissertation aims to clarify the competences of the Member States in the 
pursuit of environmental objectives by means of taxation in particular. The underlying ten-
sion is balancing between the Member States’ freedom to pursue their legitimate regulatory 
policies and the protection of the State aid regime and the objectives it pursues. In the end, 
the scope of State aid control is a question of constitutional balance between the competences 
of the EU and the Member States.13 Therefore, the research questions of this dissertation 
may be listed as follows: 
 
1) May and should environmental objectives play a role in EU State aid law?  
2) What is the current standing of environmental objectives in the assessment of the 
cumulative criteria for fiscal State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU? 
3) What types of measures in the field of environmental taxation may escape classifi-
cation as prohibited State aid? 
4) Should the interpretation of the cumulative criteria be altered to better respect the 
integration principle laid down in Article 11 TFEU and the binding emission reduc-
tion targets imposed on Member States?  
 
Shedding light on these questions should enable a better understanding of the range of 
measures which Member States may use to address environmental issues under the current 
State aid framework, and put together the various arguments of legal scholars for and against 
a revision of the prevailing effects-based approach, according to which the objectives of the 
measure in question may only be taken into account after the assessment under Article 
107(1) TFEU in the justification stage under Article 107(3) TFEU.14 Increasing the price of 
environmentally harmful activity or products via taxes or, alternatively, decreasing the price 
 
12 EEAG, para. 1.2.(18) and recital 10. 
13 De Cecco, 2013, p. 115-116. 
14 See, for instance, Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 78-80. 
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of environmentally friendly action or products by means of tax advantages, are amongst the 
most commonly used national measures in the field of environmental protection15 due to 
which these clarifications bear practical importance.  
 
This dissertation will not focus on the practical application of the notification obligation laid 
down in Article 108(3) TFEU. However, the discussion on when the cumulative criteria are 
met in effect relates to the question of whether the measure in question must be notified, the 
significance of which should not be undermined, as the notification and the following as-
sessment procedure place an administrative burden on both the Member States and the Com-
mission. The General Block Exemption Regulation 651/2014/EU (GBER) and the “de min-
imis” Regulation 1407/2013/EU will be excluded from a throughout examination, although 
their role is briefly explained. The interpretation of Article 106 TFEU concerning services 
of general economic interest (SGEI) will likewise be only briefly discussed. Due to the lim-
ited space, the assessment of State aid in the field of public procurement as well as the ap-
plication of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) will be excluded altogether.  
 
The study begins by looking into the integration of EU competition law and environmental 
policies – what, if any, role should environmental considerations play in State aid law? In 
this chapter, different views on competition policy as well as arguments for and against in-
tegration will be introduced. Second, the rationale of environmental taxation and the division 
of competences between the EU and the Member States in the fiscal domain are discussed. 
The following chapter focuses on the definition of fiscal State aid for environmental pur-
poses and the application of the cumulative criteria under Article 107(1) TFEU, most im-
portantly the notion of material selectivity. Finally, the justification of measures classified 
as State aid under Article 107(3) TFEU is explained, after which the findings of this disser-
tation are summarised. 
 
1.3. Choice of methods 
 
Most of the discussion of this dissertation is based on the legal-dogmatic approach, which 
focuses on the interpretation and systematisation16 of EU law as shaped by the case-law of 
 
15 Kingston, 2012, p. 56. See also State aid Scoreboard, 2019, p. 20. Accordingly, tax advantages cover ap-
proximately 30 % of all State spending. 
16 Hirvonen, 2011, p. 22, 25.  
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the CJEU. In addition to textual interpretation based on the wording of the applicable provi-
sion, the systematisation of the legal norms and principles surrounding the one under inter-
pretation is necessary, as the dynamic interpretation of the case-law of the CJEU presupposes 
linking the case at hand with its systemic surroundings as well as previous case-law.17 This 
is what justifies the study of the role of Article 11 TFEU in the interpretation of Article 
107(1) TFEU, for instance. According to settled case-law of the CJEU, when interpreting a 
provision of EU law, one must consider both the wording of that provision in its context and 
the objectives that it pursues.18  
 
Hence, while a textual approach is admittedly the starting point, it is not alone sufficient in 
the interpretation of EU law. This is especially the case in the context of the Treaties, whose 
provisions are ambiguous and thus open for differing interpretations. Furthermore, it has 
been argued that the Treaties are in fact characterised by ‘purpose-driven functionalism’, by 
serving as a link between the objectives of the EU and the means to attain them.19 Therefore, 
teleological interpretation emphasising the objective of the applicable provision plays a par-
amount role in the interpretation of the Treaty articles.20  
 
In addition to the legal-dogmatic approach, the application of Article 107 TFEU will also be 
viewed in its societal context, by taking note of the relevant economic and social considera-
tions when appropriate. This is due to the unique political framework of the EU, the nature 
of State aid law as a mediator of interests, the alleged instrumentalisation of EU law21, as 
well as the fact that the findings of this study may serve law- and policymakers22. Because 
the application of State aid rules in the field of the environment is guided by instruments of 
soft law and is by its nature intertwined with opposing objectives, the efficiency of norms 
cannot be studied on grounds of positivist legal viewpoints only.23  
 
 
17 Raitio 2016, p. 186-188.  
18 C-283/81, CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, para. 20. To this effect, see also Joined 
Cases C-255/18, State Street Bank International, ECLI:EU:C:2019:967, para 34, C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, 
UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, para. 31, C-379/15, Association France Nature Environnement, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:603, para 49. 
19 Lenaerts; Gutierrez - Fons, 2014, p. 16.  
20 Ibid., p. 31. 
21 Van Gestel; Micklitz, 2014, p. 297-298. 
22 Minkkinen, 2017, p. 919. 
23 Määttä, 2000, p. 337-340. 
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The theoretical discussion, which, together with the examination of the case-law of the CJEU 
forms the backbone of this study, is based on academic literature and articles. Decisions of 
the Commission will be referred to when appropriate, although it builds upon the case-law 
of the CJEU when deciding on individual cases. However, the role of the Commission as a 
rule-maker is significant due to its competence to issue soft law guidance.24 Hence, the rel-
evant soft law instruments issued by the Commission will be referred to throughout the text. 
Finally, for the purposes of providing a comprehensive overview on the subject, some sta-
tistics and policy documents will be referred to in the introductory chapters. 
  
 
24 Chari et. al., p. 21-23. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, the guidance of 
which is based on the rulings of the CJEU. 
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2. THE INTEGRATION OF EU STATE AID POLICY AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY  
 
2.1. The objectives of fiscal State aid control and policy  
 
According to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the internal market of the 
EU shall be based on, inter alia, a highly competitive social market economy. The notion of 
market economy entails that the allocation of resources in the society is determined by sup-
ply and demand and should not be affected by State intervention.25 Therefore, the very con-
cept of State aid is fundamentally incompatible with the ideal of a market economy. How-
ever, the ideal of the market as an entirely self-regulating system has been found unfeasible, 
due to which it has been accepted that government intervention may sometimes be appropri-
ate. For instance, it has been recognised that when undertakings are allowed to determine 
their own actions freely, they are likely to act in ways which are profitable to them but may 
be detrimental to the society as a whole.26 Hence, well-planned utilisation of State aid in 
order to attain public policy objectives is supported by the present understanding of the func-
tioning of the market economy in practise.  
 
Whereas State aid policy is a part of competition policy, its objectives are not entirely equal 
to it. The objectives of State aid policy may be derived from the wording of Article 107(1) 
TFEU as well as from the guidelines of the Commission. Article 107(1) TFEU reads as 
follows: “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form what-
soever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the internal market”. As the wording shows, State aid law has charac-
teristics of both EU competition and internal market law. The ‘competition policy objective’ 
of State aid control is to ensure market efficiency and the resulting consumer welfare by 
restricting the use of aid measures which disturb the normal functioning of the market. The 
‘internal market objective’, on the other hand, is to ensure proper functioning of the internal 
market by securing undistorted trade between the Member States.27 It should be noted that 
State aid control applies to measures applicable within the Member State concerned, not 
 
25 Jones – Sufrin –  Dunne, 2019, p. 2.   
26 Ibid. p. 2-3.  
27 De Cecco, 2013, p. 32, 38.  
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between Member States28, although it is presumed that trade between the Member States is 
distorted when the other cumulative criteria are met as explained later below in Chapter 4.4. 
 
Hence, State aid control aims to protect undistorted competition and trade. With respect to 
fiscal measures, it has been argued that an additional aim would be preventing harmful tax 
competition, as tax measures favouring certain undertakings may impair the level playing 
field of competition.29 Although the prevention of harmful tax competition is not recognised 
as an independent objective30, it is in line  with the prohibition of distortion of competition 
and with the increasingly strict State aid control aimed at maximising the effect utile of Ar-
ticle 107(1) TFEU, which appears to also entail elements of fiscal control.31  
 
It is considered that these aims are protected when aid measures are notified and subject to 
the review of the Commission, whose task is to ensure that the measure in question is justi-
fied, proportionate and necessary. Simply put, an aid measure may be considered compatible 
with the internal market only if it 1) contributes to a well-defined objective of common in-
terest, and 2) there is a need for State intervention. Hence, State aid may be allowed when 
the measure in question addresses a situation where it can improve the functioning of the 
market by promoting the achievement of an objective which the market forces alone cannot 
attain. The aid measure should incentivise the undertakings concerned to engage in an activ-
ity which they otherwise would not carry out or would carry out in a different, less effective, 
manner.32 With regard to State aid for environmental protection, the general objective is to 
increase the level of environmental protection compared to the level that would be achieved 
in the absence of the aid.33 Therefore, the function of State aid control is to ensure that any 
detriment arising from distortions of competition is outweighed by the public purpose pur-
sued by the aid.34 An important point should already be mentioned at this stage, which is the 
so-called effects-based approach in State aid law. Accordingly, Article 107(1) TFEU does 
not make a distinction according to the causes or aims of the measure concerned but defines 
 
28 Ibid., p. 41. 
29 Terra – Wattel, 2012, p. 26, 107-108. See also Jiménez in European tax integration: law, policy and poli-
tics, 2018, p. 298. 
30 For criticism, see, inter alia, Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P., Com-
mission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2011:215, paras. 133-134. 
31 Jiménez in European tax integration: law, policy and politics, 2018, p. 295-297. See also Communication 
from the Commission, EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM(2012) 0209 final, para. 5, 14.  
32 See EEAG Section 3.1. para. 27. 
33 EEAG, Section 3.2.1.1. para. 30.  
34 EEAG, Section 3.1. para. 26. See also Chari et. al. in State aid law of the European Union, 2016, p. 6.  
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it according to its effects35, meaning that the objective of the measure does not play a role in 
the assessment of whether it constitutes State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU or not.36 
 
It may also be noted that the effects of State aid control are twofold in the sense that the 
interpretation of Article 107 TFEU results into negative market integration by indirectly 
bringing the practises in different Member States closer to each other, in addition to which 
the soft law instruments such as the guidelines issued by the Commission result into positive 
harmonisation of the permitted practices. The control via the interpretation of Article 107 
TFEU protects competition and the internal market, whereas the Commission guidelines 
make use of State aid as a policy tool to attain EU level objectives in a manner which is 
considered efficient, even if they would not be directly linked with competition.37  
 
The Member States on the other hand use State aid measures as a tool used to attain various 
public policy objectives by incentivising undertakings to behave in a manner which pro-
motes the attainment of the objective in question.38 When it comes to fiscal measures, the 
Member State government typically has several goals in addition to the general aim of rais-
ing revenue39, such as the promotion of the protection of the environment. However, State 
aid control limits the regulatory autonomy of the Member States by defining which measures 
are permissible. In fact, the broad interpretation of the notion of State aid by the CJEU has 
arguably enabled the Commission to act in a rather autonomous way against the Member 
States.40 In order to be in line with the raison d'être of State aid, the premise is that there 
must be a need for State intervention, which in terms of environmental taxes is often estab-
lished by showing that they address a particular market failure.41  
 
Negative externalities are amongst the most relevant market failures in the context of envi-
ronmental State aid, which are defined as instances where markets do not produce efficient 
outcomes. In such cases, State intervention may improve the efficiency of the economy if 
 
35 C-173/73, Italy v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1974:71, para. 13, C-56/93, Belgium v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:64, para. 79. 
36 See, for instance, Van de Casteele in Competition Law. Vol. 4, State aid, 2016, p. 188. 
37 De Cecco, 2013, p. 39-40.   
38 Chari et. al. in State aid law of the European Union, 2016, p. 3.  
39 Jiménez in European tax integration: law, policy and politics, 2018, p. 294. 
40 See, for instance, Peters, 2019, p. 14, and Bartosch in Research Handbook on European State Aid Law, 
2011, p. 179. 
41 Verouden and Stehmann, 2016, p. 41. 
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the benefits of the intervention outweigh the costs.42 Negative externalities arise when pol-
lution is not adequately priced, i.e. the undertaking in question does not bear the full cost of 
pollution. In this case, undertakings may lack incentives to take the negative externalities 
arising from their activities into account, which leads to a situation where the production 
costs borne by the undertaking are lower than the costs borne by the society.43  
 
Finally, it should be noted that activities which do not constitute a market failure may be 
subject to an aid measure, too, depending on preferences of the society.44 However, the con-
trol appears relatively strict, as even the existence of a clear market failure may not justify 
the need for State intervention, because State aid should in principle be used as the last resort. 
This becomes apparent from the EEAG, according to which there is no need for State inter-
vention if there are already policies or measures which address the market failure in question. 
Additional State aid measures may nevertheless be directed at a residual market failure, 
which remains unaddressed by other means.45  
 
2.2. The objectives of environmental policy  
 
2.2.1. Sustainable development and the objectives of EU environmental policy 
 
When defining the environmental objectives of the EU, Article 3 TEU may likewise be re-
ferred to as a starting point. Accordingly, the general objectives of the EU include working 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth as well as a 
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. Hence, sustain-
ability and environmental values are embedded in the general policy of the EU. It is im-
portant to note however that the concept of sustainable development means integrating en-
vironmental, social and economic aims, and therefore necessitates balancing between the 
three aspects.46 The social aspect would presuppose, for instance, that the different socio-
 
42 Ibid., p. 40-42. 
43 EEAG, Section 3.2.2.1 para. 35(a). Externalities may also arise in the form of an action or negligence 
which may increase the costs of other actors which rely on a clean environment in their business activities. 
With this respect, see Verouden and Stehmann, 2016, p. 43. 
44 Verouden and Stehmann, 2016, p. 40-42. See also EEAG Section 3.1. para. 27(b). 
45 EEAG, Section 3.2.2.1 para. 36, Section 3.2.3.1. para 44, and Section 3.6. paras. 161-162. For instance, aid 
to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in order to promote the long term decarbonisation objectives of the EU 
is considered to address a residual market failure, as the other instruments in place with this respect do not 
(yet) guarantee the full achievement of these objectives.  
46 Cordonier Segger; Weeramantry, 2004, p. 2-3. See also Cordonier Segger; Khalfan, 2004, p. 47. 
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economic realities of the Member States are considered when imposing binding emission 
reduction targets, i.e. the resulting financial burden should be in proportion to the resources 
of the Member State in question.  
 
EU law does not provide for a clear-cut definition of the concept of sustainable development 
and nor do the various EU strategies mentioning it. Therefore, the enforceability of the con-
cept has been questioned.47 It has nevertheless been argued that its widespread use legiti-
mises its classification as a general principle of law.48  It appears that the following elements 
comprise sustainable development as a legal concept: 1) the need to preserve natural re-
sources for the benefit of the future, 2) the aim of exploiting natural resources in a manner 
which is ‘sustainable’, or ‘prudent’, 3) the ‘equitable’ use of natural resources, which implies 
that use by one state must take account of the needs of other states, and 4) the need to ensure 
that environmental considerations are integrated into economic and other plans and that de-
velopment needs are taken into account in applying environmental objectives (the principle 
of integration).49 Out of these, only the integration principle discussed in Chapter 2.3.2. be-
low is clearly a part of EU law, in addition to which Article 191(1) TFEU includes a mention 
of prudent use of natural resources.50  
 
Be it as it may, it appears that the prevailing general policy of the EU is centred around the 
concept of sustainable growth, which may imply that climate / environment policy action is 
desirable as long as it does happen to the detriment of the economy. According to the Europe 
2020 strategy, sustainable growth is based on a rather economic-centred model and the idea 
of maintaining global competitiveness, with the aim of building a resource efficient econ-
omy.51 A textual reading of the Paris Agreement, to which the EU has adhered to52, also 
appears to support this approach. For instance, Article 6.4 (a) thereof reads as follows: “A 
mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustain-
able development is hereby established [...] and shall aim [t]o promote the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development “ (underlining added). It 
 
47 Calster; Reins, 2017, p. 10. 
48 See, for instance, Voigt, 2015, p. 32, 38. The principle of sustainable development has been more elabo-
rately defined in international environmental law and also invoke by international courts, although it is not 
well-established in this forum, either. 
49 Sands, 2003, p. 253-254.  
50 With respect to Union’s external action, see also Articles 3(5) and 21(2)(d)-(f) TEU. 
51 EUROPE 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM/2010/2020 final p. 12. 
52 See Article 216(2) TFEU. 
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may therefore be established that sustainable development is not an environmental principle, 
but more of a general objective of the EU, which includes taking environmental considera-
tions into account in decision-making but not prioritising them. Because sustainability ne-
cessitates balancing between the social, economic and environmental aspects, it is inevitably 
defined on a case-by-case basis and therefore applied differently in different contexts. Fur-
thermore, as a result of its abundant but vague use, the concept has suffered an inflation.53 
However, there is some discussion among academics about whether the sustainable devel-
opment should in fact mean prioritising environmental concerns. In the light of the pressing 
climate crisis, the interpretation according to which the principle of sustainable development 
necessities the balancing of economic, social and environmental objectives within the eco-
logical limits of the planet54 could provide an feasible tool for the assessment of cases which 
by their nature entail a balancing between various objectives. With this line of reasoning, if 
a State aid measure would not be realisable in the long-term due to its environmental im-
pacts, it could be considered as a negative effect to the functioning of the internal market, 
which should be outweighed by other positive effects of the measure.  
 
Article 191(1) TFEU lists the actual environmental objectives of the EU, according to which 
the EU policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of: 1) preserving, protecting 
and improving the quality of the environment, 2)  protecting human health, 3)  prudent and 
rational utilisation of natural resources, and 4) promoting measures at international level to 
deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating cli-
mate change. These rather vague objectives cannot be enforced themselves on grounds of 
the Treaty but require transposition and elaboration.55  
 
Furthermore, according to Article 191(2) TFEU, EU policy on the environment shall aim at 
a high level of protection, taking the diversity of situations in the regions of the EU into 
account. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a rule be rectified at source, 
and that the polluter should pay.56 The aim is not to maximise the protection of the 
 
53 Krämer, 2011, p. 11.  
54 Voigt, 2015, p. 38, 44-46, 48. See also Voigt, 2013, p. 152-154.  
55 Calster; Reins, 2017, p. 9, Krämer, 2011, p. 8 and 15. See also, for instance, Joined Cases C‑105/18 to 
C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, para. 29. 
56 In addition to these substantive principles of EU environmental law, the general principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality included in Article 5(3) TEU are applicable to environmental matters, too. See, for in-
stance, Calster; Reins, 2017, p.19. 
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environment, however, as the aim of high level of environmental protection must be bal-
anced against economic objectives, as expressed by the CJEU.57 The CJEU has also stated 
that Article 191(2) TFEU does no more than define the general environmental objectives of 
the EU, since it confers the responsibility for deciding what action is to be taken in order to 
attain those objectives on the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.58 
It may however be noted that the status of the environmental principles is subject to some 
level of unclarity. For instance, the GC has referred to the precautionary principle as a gen-
eral principle of EU law.59 
 
Nevertheless, it is well established that the protection of the environment constitutes one of 
the essential objectives of the EU60, and that the objectives stemming from Article 3(3) TEU 
and 191(1)-(2) TFEU must be reconciled with other provisions of EU primary law.61 With 
respect to economic considerations, the CJEU has stated that the EU’s tasks include the pro-
motion of sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment.62 In terms of 
EU energy policy, the CJEU has stated that it is clear from Article 194(1)(c) TFEU that the 
development of renewable energy is one of the objectives that must guide it.63 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the objectives of energy policy are not necessarily related to 
the environment64, although some energy taxes are categorised as environmental taxes as 
discussed later below. For instance, the primary objective of the Energy Taxation Directive 
2003/96/EC (ETD) is the proper functioning of the internal market, but the secondary objec-
tives are various ranging from environmental ones to ones relating to the competitiveness of 
the EU economy.65  
 
 
57 C-343/09, Afton Chemical, ECLI:EU:C:2010:419, para. 56.  
58 Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, para. 28, C-129/16, Túrkevei Tejter-
melő Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2017:547, para. 36. See also C-534/13, Fipa Group and Others, EU:C:2015:140, para. 
39 and the case-law cited.  
59 T-392/02, Solvay Pharmaceuticals v Council, ECLI:EU:T:2003:277, para. 121 
60 See, for instance, Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v ADBHU, ECLI:EU:C:1985:59, para. 13, C-
302/86, Commission v Denmark, ECLI:EU:C:1988:421, para 8. 
61 C-379/15, Association France Nature Environnement, ECLI:EU:C:2016:603, para. 35-36.  
62 C‑213/96 Outokumpu, ECLI:EU:C:1998:155, para. 32.  
63 See Joined Cases C-215/16, C-216/16, C-220/16 and C-221/16, Elecdey Carcelen, ECLI:EU:C:2017:705, 
para 38, C-242/17, L.E.G.O., ECLI:EU:C:2018:804, para. 64, C-549/15, E.ON Biofor Sverige, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:490, para. 85, C-492/14, Essent Belgium, EU:C:2016:732, para. 101, C-573/12, Ålands 
Vindkraft, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, para. 78, and C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160, para. 73.  
64 See, for instance, Ezcurra, 2014. 
65 Commission Staff Working document, evaluation of the Council Directive 2003/96/EC, SWD(2019) 329 
final, p. 7. 
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2.2.2. The polluter pays principle 
 
In terms of the environmental principles of the EU, the polluter pays principle (PPP) is the 
most relevant in the context of environmental State aid and especially in relation to environ-
mental taxation. The PPP necessitates that authorities should promote the internalisation of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments because the polluter should in 
principle bear the cost of  the pollution it causes.66 In other words, it is against the PPP if the 
cost of environmental pollution caused by undertakings is borne by the public.67 The inter-
nalisation of the negative environmental costs requires State intervention either by means of 
taxation that corresponds to the estimated economic value of the environmental damage or 
by means of imposing regulatory standards which address the activity that is considered 
harmful.68 The logic of the PPP is also reflected in the definition of an environmental tax in 
the context of State aid as laid down in the EEAG as discussed later below.69  
 
The case-law of the CJEU appears to confirm that the PPP is not of independent nature, but 
may instead be referred to either in a complementary manner or when codified in secondary 
legislation just like the other principles laid down in Article 191(2) TFEU.70 It has been 
argued that the PPP should be applied consistently with the principle of prevention, as it 
should step in once the application of the prevention principle has failed and the damage has 
occurred.71 The prevention principle necessitates that risks which occur or are likely to occur 
while carrying out a certain activity must be addressed so that the action concerned does not 
damage the environment.72 The reliance on the PPP alone in the context of State aid may 
thus be criticised as insufficient as it could be argued that it in effect grants a right to pollute 
with an attached price, which, for the polluting undertaking, merely represents a supplemen-
tary tax. In principle, this also encourages polluters to pass their costs onwards.73Although 
both of these principles promote addressing the negative effects of climate change and could 
therefore, in principle, be referred to when justifying the need for environmental State aid, 
 
66 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 1992, principle 16. See also EEAG, Section 1.3. para. 28. 
67 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-169/08, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, ECLI:EU:C:2009:420, 
para. 74. 
68 De Sadeleer, 2002, p. 21, 28.  
69 EEAG, Section 19 paras. 15, 25-28.  
70 See e.g. Case C-534/13, Fipa Group and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:140, paras. 38-42.  
71 Calster; Reins, 2017, p. 37. See also De Sadeleer, 2002, p. 35-36. 
72 Calster; Reins, 2017, p. 33-34. See also Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, 1972, principle 21. 
73 De Sadeleer, 2002, p. 35-36.  
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they are rarely expressly relied on as a justification for an aid measure. One recent judge-
ment, however, may be discussed by means of example.  
 
The judgement of the GC in Case T‑356/15 concerns State aid granted in support of the 
Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, which was notified by the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland and opposed to by Luxembourg and Austria. Austria and Luxembourg ar-
gued that there is a conflict between the promotion of nuclear energy and the principle of 
protection of the environment, and the PPP, amongst others. 
 
Here, the GC started with an argument which may be characterised as both procedural and 
teleological, stating that because the United Kingdom did not specifically intend, through 
the State aid measures at issue, to give effect to these principles, the Commission was not 
obliged to take them into account. Second, the GC pointed out that although protection of 
the environment must be integrated into the definition and implementation of EU policies, it 
does not constitute, per se, one of the components of the internal market, which is character-
ised by the four fundamental freedoms. Consequently, the Commission was not obliged to 
consider the extent to which the measures at issue are detrimental to the implementation of 
these principles. Lastly, the GC emphasised the complementary nature of these principles 
and stated that no EU environmental legislation was invoked in this connection.74 Hence, it 
appears that the consideration of environmental objectives is limited to the justification of 
State aid for environmental purposes or to cases where such principles are enforced in sec-
ondary legislation applicable in the case in question. 
 
Importantly, however, Article 11 TFEU provides that environmental protection require-
ments must be integrated into the definition and implementation of EU policies and activi-
ties. The significance of Article 11 TFEU and other relevant provisions promoting policy 
integration will be discussed next. 
 
 
 
 
 
74 T-356/15,  Austria v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:439, paras. 110, 512-518. See also T-57/11, Castelnou 
Energía v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021, paras. 189-191. 
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2.3. The integration of the two policies 
 
2.3.1. The elasticity of EU competition policy 
 
The basic idea behind competition policy is that distortions of competitions result into effi-
ciency losses, which in turn decrease consumer welfare, as in the context of competition 
policy, total welfare equals to the effectiveness of market performance. In the context of EU 
competition policy, consumer welfare has been equalised as better quality, lower prices, and 
a wider choice of goods and services.75 When assessing the impacts of climate change policy 
to welfare costs, for instance, the costs of all the different individual actions that need to be 
taken should be calculated.76 Hence, factors such as a clean environment are not considered 
when calculating consumer welfare. 
 
It has however been argued that because safeguarding the functioning of the internal market 
is a central objective of Article 107(1) TFEU, it should be understood in a broader context 
than merely on the basis on conditions of competition.77 The broad understanding of Article 
107(1) TFEU would require that the objectives of the internal market as a whole are taken 
into account when designing State aid control, which would necessitate balancing between 
several Treaty objectives, including those relating to the environment.78 In principle, the ap-
plication of State aid rules should not lead to a situation which is contrary to any other spe-
cific Treaty provision.79 
 
Opinions amongst legal scholars and economists about whether such an approach which 
would allow the consideration of non-economic objectives in competition policy, including 
State aid policy, differ. Traditional ordoliberal theory, significant especially at the early 
stages of the competition policy of the EU, aims at guaranteeing the freedom of competition 
but also considers economy as interdependent with other policy areas within the society and 
 
75 In this regard, see, for instance, Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission's en-
forcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings, (2009/C 45/02), para 5. However, it should be noted that The CJEU has not always adhered to 
the same (economic) consumer welfare standard as the Commission. Instead, it has stated on several occa-
sions that the function of competition rules is “to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of 
the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European 
Union”. With this respect, see Jones – Sufrin – Dunne, 2019, p. 49. 
76 Krupnick and Parry, 2012, p. 9.  
77 See, inter alia, De Cecco, 2013, p. 31.  
78 Chari et. al., 2016, p. 9. 
79 See, for instance, Case C-113/00, Spain v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:507, para. 78.  
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takes note on the interaction between different policy decisions. Kingston argues that it there-
fore rejects a purely textual reading of law to the detriment of fundamental objectives ex-
pressed in the Treaties, and thus requires that other objectives laid down therein must be 
taken into account in competition policy, too.80 According to a more narrow view, however, 
the aim of ordoliberalism is simply to protect competition.81  
 
Nevertheless, De Cecco has observed that the current State aid regime appears to be far away 
from the ordoliberal model in practice.82 This is backed up by the findings of Bartalevich, 
according to whom it appears that the EU has shifted from the somewhat ordoliberal-based 
approach to a ‘more economic’ one83, influenced by the Chicago school theory, which leaves 
no room for non-economic considerations as it views efficiency as the only goal of compe-
tition law.84 This approach omits policy considerations and focuses on economic rationality, 
aiming solely at the maximisation consumer welfare and efficient allocation of resources.85 
The concept of the ‘more economic approach’ is however not deductible to a single compe-
tition theory, but instead means more extensive use of economic insights when applying 
competition law.86 Furthermore, it does not imply that State aid control has become a fully 
‘economic’ field in the application of law.87 Therefore, while it indeed appears that effi-
ciency considerations have gained a strong stance, there may still be room for other consid-
erations, too. This is true especially in the field of State aid policy, which may be used to 
serve public interest objectives such as environmental ones as explained above.  
 
In my opinion, strict adherence to economic indicators only may be problematic, as at the 
Member States are obliged to meet certain emission reduction targets imposed by secondary 
legislation, such as the Effort Sharing Regulation 2018/842/EU.88 A particular issue with 
this respect is that State aid control restricts the strategic use of regulation.89 Hence, the 
regulatory means which Member States may use to channel aid towards the protection of the 
environment is limited by the rules laid down in the EEAG and the application of Article 
 
80 Kingston, 2012, p. 17-19.  
81 Jones – Sufrin – Dunne, 2019, p. 27-28, Nowag, 2017, p. 34-35.  
82 De Cecco, 2013, p. 55 
83 The ’more economic approach’ in fact means the ‘consumer welfare approach’ to EU competition law, see 
Jones – Sufrin – Dunne, 2019, p. 48. 
84 Bartalevich, 2016, p. 267-271 and 279-280. See also Jones – Sufrin – Dunne, p. 15-19.  
85 Schweitzer; Patel, 2013, p. 207-208.  
86 Schweitzer; Patel, 2013, p. 220. See also Kingston, 2012, p. 38-39. 
87 Verouden and Stehmann, 2016, p. 92.  
88 See Article 4 of the Regulation.  
89 De Cecco, 2013, p. 55.  
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107 TFEU. It has been argued that the need for political steering via the means of State aid 
will only grow in the coming decades, as it provides a means to pursue climate change ob-
jectives especially in the energy sector.90 Hence, more flexibility may be called for in the 
future. 
 
In fact, Jones, Sufrin, and Dunne argue that the recognition of climate change crisis will 
inevitably result into increasing calls for competition policy to take account of climate 
change issues as its major consideration.91 This is reflected in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, 
too, according to which socially acceptable and just (this refers to the distribution of the 
economic burden resulting from the required actions) transition to a sustainable low-carbon 
economy necessitates changes in investment behaviour, as regards both public and private 
investment.92 Indeed, the relevant State aid rules will be revised by 2022 in the light of the 
policy objectives of the European Green Deal in order to better enable sustainable invest-
ments. With this respect, it is positive that one aim is to allow for more flexibility in the use 
of State aid in the transition to climate neutral production processes. It is nevertheless clear 
that the underlying logic remains the same: public support should be limited to what is nec-
essary, as market forces should as a rule incentivise action to the desired direction.93 
 
2.3.2. Article 11 TFEU  
 
As discussed above, the Treaties include several provisions which in one way or another 
promote policy integration. Already the reference to sustainable market economy expressed 
in Article 3(3) TEU speaks for an integrated policy, which is further endorsed by Article 7 
TFEU, according to which the EU shall ensure consistency between its policies and activi-
ties, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral 
of powers. In addition, Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union requires that a high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the 
quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the EU and ensured in 
accordance with the principle of sustainable development.94 In fact, the wording of this 
 
90 Schöning and Ziegler, 2018, p. 4. 
91 Jones – Sufrin – Dunne, 2019, p. 34.  
92 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, recital 19.  
93 Communication from the Commission, Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, COM(2020) 21 final, p. 12-
13. 
94 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. See also 
Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 6(1) TEU.  
20 
  
article is very similar to the wording of Article 11 TFEU, which is particularly significant in 
the context of this dissertation. It reads as follows: “Environmental protection requirements 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activ-
ities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” 
 
On a general note, it may be observed that EU State aid law, like Article 11 TFEU, is char-
acterised by the balancing of interests, as State aid policy may be used as a policy tool at the 
expense of market efficiency. However, the application of environmental integration obli-
gation laid down Article 11 TFEU has been rather limited especially in the field of compe-
tition law95, regardless of the fact that it has been characterised by the ECJ as a provision 
which emphasises the fundamental nature of the objective of protection of the environment 
and its extension across different policies and activities.96 Next, we will enter the discussion 
on why this leaves room for improvement. 
 
When discussing the legal status of Article 11 TFEU, it is noteworthy that the Maastricht 
Treaty specifically modified its wording so that it imposed a binding obligation.97 It therefore 
imposes a concrete obligation to integrate environmental protection requirements in all pol-
icies and activities of the EU, taking the objectives of environmental policy laid down in 
Article 191(1)-(2) TFEU into account.98 It has also been argued that it requires the CJEU to 
choose the most environmentally-friendly option when weighing up ecological and eco-
nomic interests.99 Hence, the ratio legis of Article 11 TFEU is that EU law must be inter-
preted in a manner which renders it consistent with environmental protection requirements 
laid down in Articles 191 TFEU and 3 TEU.100 However, the scope of application of the 
article and its legal status remain unclear.  
 
Nowag argues that Article 11 TFEU binds the EU institutions both in policy-making and 
when adopting individual measures, such as competition decisions.101 In contrast, it has also 
been argued that it only applies at the stage of general policy-making at EU level and not to 
 
95 Nowag, 2015, p. 15.  
96 C-176/03, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2005:542, paras. 41-42. 
97 Nowag, 2017, p. 16, De Sadeleer, 2014, p. 25. 
98 Voigt, 2015, p. 46-47. See also Krämer, 2011, p. 20-21, Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-379/98, 
PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2000:585, para. 231. 
99 De Sadeleer, 2014, p. 29. See also Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:585, para. 232. 
100 Nowag. 2017, p. 20. See also Nowag, 2015, p. 28-29. 
101 Nowag. 2017, p. 21, Sjåfell, 2015, p. 56-62, 64-65. 
21 
  
individual decisions.102 However, according to the wording of the article itself, it applies to 
both EU policies and activities. It is difficult to argue that activities could not include EU 
measures, such as competition decisions. Furthermore, Article 11 TFEU speaks of imple-
mentation, due to which the effect utile of the provision would necessitate that Member 
States may have to respect it while implementing EU policies and activities.103 The case-law 
of the CJEU appears to support Nowag’s line of interpretation to some extent, as it has re-
ferred to Article 11 TFEU in the connection of application of EU law and not merely in the 
context of implementation of EU policies.104  
 
According to Kingston, Article 11 TFEU is a clear objective of EU policy, not a principle, 
as there is no discretion left for the EU institutions with respect to its application in a specific 
situation. In contrast, principles require a weighing up or balancing process in applying them 
in a specific case.105 On the other hand, the application of the environmental integration 
obligation as an overarching principle could allow its use in a similar manner than the general 
principles of EU law such as the proportionality principle. This would mean that the integra-
tion obligation could be used as guidelines in the balancing of conflicting rules and therefore 
also in ensuring coherence with the aims and values of the EU.106 In fact, Article 11 TFEU 
in principle satisfies many of the elements generally considered as the criteria for a general 
principle of EU law: it carries legal effects, is general in nature but appropriately precise, 
and has a fundamental status granted upon by primary law. However, a status as a general 
principle would also necessitate that its proclaimed as such by the CJEU in a manner which 
renders it binding on the Member States when implementing EU law107, which, as explained 
above, remains under debate.  
 
Integration with a view of promoting sustainable development naturally necessitates balanc-
ing between the economic, social and environmental interests. With respect to the balancing 
between the different objectives, Kingston has provided three different options for the 
 
102 See, for instance, Krämer, 2011, p. 21.  
103 Nowag, 2017, p. 23-24, Kingston, 2013, p. 85.  
104 See, for instance, Joined Cases C-626/15 and C-659/16, Commission v Council (AMP Antarctique), 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:925, paras. 100-101, C-549/15, E.ON Biofor Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2017:490, para. 48, C-
513/99, Concordia Bus Finland, ECLI:EU:C:2002:495, para. 57.  
105 Kingston, 2013, p. 89-90. See also Thieffry, 2018, p. 70, who also argues that Article 11 TFEU constitutes 
a rule and not a principle, although arguing for a more limited scope of application than Kingston.  
106 See Koskenniemi, 1985, p. 134-136, who is discussing the nature of principles as legal norms considering 
the theories provided by scholars such as Dworkin, Eckhoff and Sundby. 
107 See by analogy, Wimmer, 2014, p. 333-334. 
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hierarchical status of Article 11 TFEU. According to the first one, decision-makers could 
choose whether or not to adjust their policies, as long as they simply take environmental 
considerations into account – an option which may be rejected due to the constitutional status 
of environmental considerations in the Treaties as discussed above.108 If Article 11 TEU is 
understood merely as a procedural obligation, there is a risk that it leads to situations where 
economic interests are seen as the primary interest, to which the other (environmental) con-
siderations are subsumed.109  
 
According to the second option provided by Kingston, decision-makers must pursue envi-
ronmental aims systemically alongside each specific sectoral objective in question, and 
where several options are possible, choose the most environmentally friendly one. This ap-
proach has been supported by Nowag who considers it to be consistent with the Treaties.110 
In fact, the duty to seek balance between the various objectives of the Treaties is itself an 
intrinsic part of EU law, reflected in Articles 2 and 3 TEU, which prioritise no objective over 
another.111 In my opinion, this approach could provide enough guidance to authorities while 
allowing them to take their national circumstances as well as the specific circumstances of 
the case at issue into account in line with the division of competences. 
 
The third option would necessitate prioritising environmental protection requirements over 
all conflicting objectives, an interpretation Kingston herself promotes for and other scholars 
such as Wiesbrock have supported.112 I agree with Kingston to the extent that the third option 
fits best with the majority of scientific opinion with regard to the detrimental effects of cli-
mate change. I also adhere to her view according to which sufficient environmental resources 
are a fundamental prerequisite for the social market economy and that in the end, consumer 
surplus is dependent on the sufficiency of environmental resources and the ability of the 
environment to provide essential services in the future.113 However, I find it challenging to 
argue that the wording of the Treaties would lead one to conclude that environmental re-
quirements should always be given priority – as established above, no priority in terms of 
EU objectives appears to have been prescribed for in the Treaties. On the other hand, a more 
 
108 Kingston, 2012, p. 113.  
109 Voigt, 2015, p. 41.  
110 Kingston, 2012, p. 113, Nowag, 2017, p. 30.  
111 Nowag, 2017, p. 30, Krämer, 2011, p. 20. 
112 Kingston, p. 2012, p. 113-114 and Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 75-76.  
113 Ibid. p. 114-115, 189.  
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teleological approach could lead to a different conclusion. Should the principle of sustaina-
ble development be enforced in a manner which would in reality necessitate giving priority 
to the sustainability of the planet, then also already the wording of Article 11 TFEU would 
require that the integration of environmental protection requirements into the implementa-
tion of the EU’s policies and activities should be done in a sustainable manner which respects 
the limits of the planet and its bearing capacity also in the future.114 This option cannot be 
excluded, although in the light of the nature of EU politics, which are characterised by the 
balancing of the varying interests and socio-economic realities of the Member States, its 
materialisation appears unlikely at least in the near future. What is clear is that the principle 
of integration does not mean that environmental objectives may merely be routinely bal-
anced against other fundamental objectives of the EU.115 
 
Nowag has studied how Article 11 TFEU could and has been applied in EU State aid law 
and has presented a theory according to which the integration obligation laid down therein 
may be divided into preventative and supportive integration. Preventative integration means 
integration at the level of the concept of State aid itself. According to Nowag, this would 
necessitate taking environmental considerations into account already in the classification of 
aid under Article 107(1) TFEU, an option discussed in detail Chapter 4 below.116 Supportive 
integration – integration by means of balancing – is the prevailing method of interpretation 
in the context of State aid and is most clearly adhered to in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. 
Supportive integration means the consideration of environmental objectives when balancing 
the negative and positive effects of the aid under Article 107(3) TFEU, as discussed later in 
Chapter 5.117 However, as Wiesbrock and Nowag point out, taking environmental consider-
ations into account only when assessing the compatibility of the measure under 107(3) TFEU 
and not  in the context of classification of aid under 107(1) TFEU does not comply with 
Article 11 TFEU, if it is understood as requiring the consideration of environmental objec-
tives at all stages of decision-making. In order for the State aid policy to be fully in line with 
the integration principle, environmental considerations should be integrated into the appli-
cation of both Article 107(1) and 107(3) TFEU.118 
 
114 Voigt, 2015, p. 45, Sjåfell, 2015, p. 60-61. 
115 See Opinion of AG Bot in Joined Cases C‑204/12 to C‑208/12, Essent Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2013:294, 
para. 97. 
116 Nowag, 2017, p. 145-146 
117 Nowag, 2017, p. 180-182. 
118 Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 77, Nowag, 2017, p. 110. 
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As mentioned above, the integration principle plays a particularly important role when as-
sessing whether a given measure may be considered compatible with the internal market 
under Article 107(3) TFEU.119 According to the prevailing judicial discourse, the require-
ments arising from the environmental integration principle are thus as a rule only taken into 
account when considering whether a national measure which has already been classified as 
State aid may be exempted from the general prohibition State aid, as in line with the effects-
based approach, the question of whether a given measure constitutes aid is assessed on 
grounds of its effects on the market, not its objectives.120 Hence, it appears established case-
law that public policy objectives are not considered when classifying a particular measure 
as State aid, but only when assessing whether that measure is compatible with the internal 
market and therefore justified under Article 107(3) TFEU.121  
 
Therefore, environmental objectives are as a rule not taken into account when applying Ar-
ticle 107(1) TFEU, although some exceptions exist. Furthermore, there are some indicators 
which imply that the CJEU may be departing from its strict adherence to the effects-based 
approach. The following chapters discuss whether the interpretation of the State aid provi-
sions in their broader legal context would in fact necessitate its reconsideration and allow 
the consideration of the public policy objective to some extent already in the context of Ar-
ticle 107(1) TFEU. With respect to fiscal aid measures, there appears to be some room for 
flexibility in the assessment of material selectivity in particular.  
  
 
119 See, for instance, Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:419, para. 102. 
120 See, i.e., C-241/94, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1996:353, para. 20, C-126/01, GEMO SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:622, para. 34, C-172/03, Heiser, ECLI:EU:C:2005:130, para. 46, C-487/06 P, British 
Aggregates v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:757, para. 85, C-279/08 P, Commission v Netherlands, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, para. 75, Joined cases C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P and C-76/09 P, Comitato "Venezia vuole 
vivere" and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:368, para. 94, C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems 
GmbH v Hauptzollamt Osnabrück, ECLI:EU:C:2015:354, para. 75, C-203/16 P, Andres (faillite Heitkamp 
BauHolding) v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, para. 91.  
121 See, inter alia, C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, EU:C:2008:757, para. 92. 
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3. FISCAL STATE AID FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES  
 
3.1. Division of competences in the field of fiscal State aid 
 
For the purposes of understanding fiscal State aid for environmental purposes, especially in 
the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental and energy taxes, it is important 
to be aware of the division of competences between the EU and the Member States with this 
respect. The tension is clear: EU-wide State aid control limits the national authorities’ free-
dom to pursue their environmental and taxation policies, and thus also the means by which 
the Member States may aim to attain the climate policy targets imposed by binding EU and 
national law.  
 
The EU has exclusive competence in establishing the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market, hence also in State aid law. However, the EU and the 
Member States share competence with regard to the environment and energy, which means 
that the Member States are free to legislate in environmental matters which have not (yet) 
been regulated at EU level.122 This is also reflected in the EEAG, according to which an aid 
measure may be compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU if it goes 
beyond EU standards on environmental protection or increases the level of environmental 
protection in the absence of EU standards, for instance.123 
 
The rationale of the principle of conferral means that the EU shall act only within the limits 
of the competences conferred upon it by the Treaties, and competences not conferred upon 
the EU remain with the Member States.124 Taxation is not among any of the competences 
expressly conferred upon the EU and therefore in principle remains within the competence 
of the Member States, although they must respect EU law while implementing fiscal 
measures.125 However, as the EU has exclusive competence in the field of customs union, 
all customs duties on imports and exports are within the competence of the EU.126 In addi-
tion, the EU institutions may intervene in the field of taxation when national tax measures 
 
122 Articles 3-4 TFEU. See also Barnand and Peers, 2017, p. 108-109.  
123 See EEAG, Section 1.2. para. 18(a). 
124 Articles 4(1) and 5(2) TEU. 
125 Communication from the Commission, Tax policy in the European Union - Priorities for the years ahead, 
COM(2001)260 final, p. 8. 
126 See Articles 3.1.(a) and 28 TFEU. 
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may affect the functioning of the internal market, which in turn is within the shared compe-
tence of the EU and the Member States.127 The legislative action of the EU in the field of 
taxation has mostly concerned indirect taxes (such as excise duties and VAT) based on Ar-
ticle 113 TFEU.128 In fact, a significant number of aid for environmental protection in the 
form of tax reliefs and exemptions are granted based on harmonised EU law on indirect 
taxes, which are also subject to State aid control in case the application of the provision in 
question entails discretion or when the Member States introduce additional advantages going 
beyond those laid down in the harmonisation directive.129 Member States are free to grant 
exemptions or reductions from environmental taxes in non-harmonised areas when they 
serve legitimate purposes and do not fulfil the cumulative criteria laid down in Article 107(1) 
TFEU.130 
 
The only provision which may be applied in the harmonisation of direct taxes (such as com-
pany taxes) is Article 115 TFEU131, which requires unanimity in the Council. Hence, the 
main rule is that direct taxation falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States, 
although it must be exercised consistently with EU law.132 Direct taxation is therefore re-
served to the Member States’ sovereignty insofar as it is a tool of general economic policy 
and there is no harmonisation at EU level, although Commission may review measures in 
this field too in order to ensure that they are not selective by nature.133 In general, State aid 
control today is also a means of tax policy convergence between the Member States, which 
have to align their policies in accordance with the rulings of the Commission and the 
CJEU.134 It appears the State aid control with regard to fiscal measures has become stricter 
over recent years135, especially due to the broad interpretation of the selectivity criterion 
discussed later below. 
 
Furthermore, the competences of the EU have expanded beyond those defined in the Trea-
ties, partly due to the so-called judicial activism of the CJEU and partly due to the vast 
 
127 Pistone and Szudoczky, 2018, p. 36, see also Article 4.2.(a) TFEU. 
128 Lovdahl-Gormsen, 2019, p. 98, Article 113 TFEU. 
129 In this regard, see Commission Notice on the Notion of State aid, 2016, Section 3.1.2. paras. 44-45. See 
also Schöning and Ziegler, 2018, p. 23, Ezcurra, 2016, p. 198-199, Englisch, 2013. 
130 C-148/77, Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg, ECLI:EU:C:1978:173, para. 16. 
131 Pistone and Szudoczky, 2018, p. 10.  
132 See, for instance, C-383/10, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2013:364, para. 40.  
133 Terra-Wattel, 2012, p. 36-37, Merola. 2016, p. 537-538. 
134 Peters, 2019, p. 8. 
135 Rauhanen, 2017, p. 15-16.  
27 
  
amount of secondary legislation.136 Harmonisation by means of secondary law or soft law is 
called positive integration, whereas harmonisation which results from the interpretation of 
(primary) law by the CJEU is called negative integration.137 The latter will be paid attention 
to when assessing the interpretation of prohibition of State aid laid down in Article 107 
TFEU by the CJEU, as it has led to de facto indirect tax harmonisation in the field of envi-
ronment and energy.138 Generally speaking, negative integration and positive integration by 
means of soft law instruments raise more issues of legitimacy, as they are not a result of a 
political choice manifested in a legislative decision.139 It appears that the EU is at a turning 
point with respect to its approach to tax matters, and the direction seems to be towards in-
creasing positive harmonisation.140 Although not necessarily in line with the division of com-
petences, positive harmonisation by means of legislation could be more in line with the prin-
ciples of democratic decision-making than coordinating the tax systems of Member States 
be means of negative harmonisation ‘through the backdoor’. 
 
In addition, one must recall that that the Commissions enjoys broad powers and wide dis-
cretion in the exercise of State aid control.141 This results from, inter alia, the loose definition 
of State aid on the one hand, and the necessary balancing included in the assessment the 
compatibility of the aid measure with the internal market under Article 107(3) TFEU, on the 
other.142 The CJEU has stated in this respect that it should restrict itself only to determining 
whether the Commission has exceeded the scope of its discretion by a distortion or manifest 
error of assessment of the facts or by misuse of powers.143 Hence, State aid control is also 
significantly shaped by the interpretation of the Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
136 Lovdahl-Gormsen, 2019, p. 93-94.  
137 Pistone and Szudoczky, 2018, p. 36-39, Terra-Wattel, 2012, p. 36-37. 
138 See, for instance, Ezcurra, 2016, p. 217. 
139 Lovdahl-Gormsen, 2019, p. 113. See also De Cecco, 2013, p. 49. 
140 Communication from the Commission, Towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in EU 
tax policy, COM(2019) 8 final.  
141 C-333/07, Regie Networks, ECLI:EU:C:2008:764, para. 78 and case-law cited. See also Ianus et. al., 2016, 
p. 224-227. 
142 Chari et. al., 2016, p. 55-56.  
143 C-225/91, Matra v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1993:239, para. 25, C-73/11, Frucona Košice v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:32, paras. 74-76 and case-law cited. 
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3.2. Environmental taxation and State aid  
 
3.2.1. Definition of an environmental tax  
 
According to the general definition adopted in the EU, an environmental tax is “a tax whose 
tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) of something that has a proven specific negative 
impact on the environment.”144 However, the definition of an environmental tax in State aid 
context is broader, as it incorporates the idea of changing polluting behaviour. In State aid 
context, “environmental tax means a tax with a specific tax base that has a clear negative 
effect on the environment or which seeks to tax certain activities, goods or services so that 
the environmental costs may be included in their price and/or so that producers and con-
sumers are oriented towards activities which better respect the environment.”145 Hence, in 
State aid context, environmental taxes are not characterised by their specific tax base only, 
but also by their environmental objective.146  
 
The prevailing issue is the lack of consistent interpretation of the concept, and the question 
of what kind of fiscal measures may be included within the scope of aid for the protection 
of the environment remains unclear. As a result, fiscal measures which are not always in 
reality capable of promoting environmental protection are sometimes considered under the 
rules for aid for environmental protection.147 For instance, exemptions or reliefs from an 
energy tax may be classified as aid for the purposes of environmental protection even though 
they would not in fact be able to promote environmental protection.148 The Energy Taxation 
Directive 2003/96 (ETD) is under discussion with this respect, as it lays down rules based 
on the volume of the energy products consumed instead of their energy content. This has led 
to taxation which is against the climate policy objectives: for instance, renewable energy 
may be taxed at a higher rate than a competing fossil fuel, as long as the minimum rates laid 
down in the ETD are respected.149 It should be guaranteed that only those measures in the 
field of energy taxation whose objectives are truly environmental are treated under the 
framework of State aid for environmental protection.150 Nevertheless, what constitutes State 
 
144 Eurostat, Environmental taxes – A statistical guide, 2013, p. 9. 
145 See GBER, Article 2(119) and EEAG, Section 1.3. para. 19(15).  
146 T-210/02, British Aggregates v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:253, para. 114. 
147 See, inter alia, Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 91-92. 
148 Ezcurra, 2017, p. 11-12, 15.  
149 Ezcurra, 2016, p. 207. 
150 Ezcurra, 2017, p. 21-22.  
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aid with respect to fiscal measures in the energy and environment sector still depends largely 
on the interpretation of the cumulative criteria by the CJEU as discussed in Chapter 4.151 
 
3.2.2. Rationale of environmental taxation  
 
Environmental taxes belong to the category of market-based instruments (MBI), that is, eco-
nomic regulatory instruments based on their incentive effect. Simply put, MBI provide in-
centives which guide behaviour towards a desired outcome, in this case, environmentally 
friendly action. Their aim is to internalise the negative environmental externalities into the 
market actor’s decision-making processes152 by using market signals to address the market 
failure concerned.153 The State’s role in addressing these failures may be clarified by citing 
the following statement of AG Jacobs: ‘…In the absence of State intervention, a pro-
ducer[…]causing air pollution does not pay for that pollution. He can therefore ignore the 
costs to society in deciding how much to produce and at what price to sell his products. 
Pursuant to the polluter pays principle the costs of measures to deal with pollution should 
be borne not by society through general taxation but by the polluter who causes the pollu-
tion. The costs associated with the protection of the environment should be included in a 
firm's production costs (internalisation of costs). The principle can be put into practice 
through a variety of State measures such as the taxation of pollution.154 Hence, the imposi-
tion of environmental taxes generally supports the PPP. 
 
The fundamental logic behind environmental taxes comes from Pigou, as summarised by 
Milne: When the private sector imposes costs on society, a tax can shift those costs back to 
the private sector, which should result in decision-making therein which enhances the gen-
eral welfare of the society. Even when an environmental tax does not capture the full cost of 
the externalities, it can have the effect of producing a desired behavioural change, which 
leads to a more environmentally friendly action at a lower cost than costs arising from obli-
gations imposed by traditional regulatory means.155  
 
 
151 Ezcurra, 2016, p. 200. 
152 Kingston, 2012, p. 49-51.  
153 Green paper on market-based instruments for environment and related policy purposes, COM(2007) 140 
final, p.3. 
154 Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-126/01, GEMO SA, ECLI:EU:C:2002:273, para. 66. 
155 Milne, 2017. See also Pigou, 1932.  
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Environmental taxes are thus a feasible environmental policy instrument which can provide 
incentives for technological innovation and emissions reductions. In fact, the EU regards 
environmental taxes as one of the preferred instruments for addressing climate change156, 
and they also appear to be less distorting towards economic behaviour than labour and cor-
porate taxes.157 In addition, the use of MBI is more easily reconciled  with the logic of the 
market economy than imposing obligations by means of regulation.158 On the other hand, 
the idea of putting a price on pollution and therefore giving the right to pollute on a given 
price has been criticised, as the potentially harmful effects on the environment should pri-
marily be prevented.159 In addition, MBI appear to be beneficial to the environment only 
beyond a certain threshold; below the threshold, their effect is limited.160 Therefore, the uti-
lisation of MBI alone is insufficient for attaining the climate targets, as environmental con-
siderations are not inherent in the logic of the market. In fact, taxation appears to work best 
when there is already a cleaner option to which undertakings or individuals can switch to.161 
 
The assessment of whether a particular measure in fact promotes environmental protection 
is particularly challenging with regard to aid in the form of reductions in or exemptions from 
environmental taxes, which belong to the category of aid for the protection of the environ-
ment, even though they are indeed reliefs from the applicable environmental tax. This is 
because while such advantages may adversely impact the attainment of the environmental 
objective in question, they may be needed if the beneficiaries would otherwise be placed at 
such a competitive disadvantage that it would not be feasible to introduce the environmental 
tax in the first place.162 Hence, they play a role in the transition to a greener economy by 
providing flexibility to Member States and allowing for adjustment periods in the process.163 
 
Therefore, tax exemptions or reductions may facilitate a higher level of environmental taxes 
in general. However, in order to be permissible under Article 107 TFEU, they must always 
at least indirectly contribute to a higher level of environmental protection and never 
 
156 See, for instance, Communication from the Commission, Rio+20: Towards the green economy and better 
governance COM (2011)363 final, p. 8, Communication from the Commission, A Clean Planet for all: A Eu-
ropean strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy, 
COM(2018)773 final, COM(2018)773 final, p. 18. See also Krupnick and Parry, 2012, p. 1-2, 22-23. 
157 EEA Report No 17/2016, Environmental taxation and EU environmental policies, p. 5.  
158 Kingston, 2012, p. 53.  
159 See Chapter 2.2.2. 
160 Aydin et. al, 2018, p. 2415. 
161 Kingston, 2012, p. 56-57. 
162 EEAG, Section 3.7.1. para. 167. 
163 See, for instance, EEAG recital 9, Section 3.7.3. 
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undermine the overall objective of the environmental tax.164 For instance, as demonstrated 
by Nicolaides, when high taxes on all polluting activities in a particular field are not feasible, 
granting tax reliefs to some industries should in principle enable the levying of higher coun-
ter-balancing taxes on other industries with the outcome that the overall level of environ-
mental protection is as high as it would have been in a situation where the tax in question 
would have been applied uniformly.165 The rationale of tax advantages is thus often the rec-
onciliation of economic or environmental objectives by aiming at maintaining the competi-
tiveness of the undertakings concerned166, incentivising environmentally-friendly action, as 
well as encouraging the Member States to establish environmental tax schemes at an efficient 
rate by allowing them to justifiably grant exemptions when need be.167 Sometimes other 
objectives such as those relating to social policy may be the justification for the measure, 
too.168 Nevertheless, the assessment of the link between the contribution to environmental 
protection and the loss of competitiveness must be done carefully in order to ensure that the 
measure in question does not distort competition without promoting a legitimate interest.169 
Otherwise, the resulting welfare losses are not compensated by an improvement in the level 
of environmental protection.170  
 
In addition to aid in the form of reductions in or exemptions from environmental taxes, 
sometimes the environmental tax itself may constitute State aid when it is fixed in a manner 
which leads to discriminatory effects171, as discussed later below. This may be the case when 
the tax is imposed only on some undertakings in a comparable factual and legal situation, 
which may be considered as relieving the undertakings not subject to the tax from the burden 
they would normally have to bear.172  
 
 
 
 
164 EEAG, Section 3.7.1. para. 168. 
165 Nicolaides, 2015, p. 577. 
166 Terra – Wattel, 2012, p. 537. 
167 De Sadeleer, 2014, p. 447. 
168 See, for instance, Energy Taxation Directive 2003/96/EC (ETD), recital 28.  
169 Maillo, 2017, p. 6. 
170 Rauhanen, 2017, p. 139. 
171 See, for instance, T-210/02, British Aggregates v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:253. 
172 C-53/00, Ferring, ECLI:EU:C:2001:627, para. 20, Opinion of AG Szpunar in C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke 
Lippe-Ems GmbH v Hauptzollamt Osnabrück, ECLI:EU:C:2015:51, para. 69. 
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3.2.3. The role of the EEAG 
 
The purpose of Commission Guidelines such as those on State aid for environmental protec-
tion and energy 2014-2020 (EEAG) is to promote the predictability and transparency of its 
decision-making as well as to draw boundaries to its discretion.173 The EEAG lays down 
conditions under which environmental aid may be deemed compatible with the internal mar-
ket under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU after being classified as prohibited State aid under Article 
107(1) TFEU. However, as the focus of this dissertation is in the assessment of the cumula-
tive criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU, the compatibility assessment under Article 
107(3)(c) will be only briefly discussed later in Chapter 5 below. It should be noted that the 
EEAG also lays down the applicable notification thresholds, although they do not apply to 
fiscal aid in the form of reductions in or exemptions from environmental taxes regulated in 
Section 3.7. thereof. Instead, aid not covered by Section 3.7 is be subject to an individual 
assessment if the thresholds in that Section are exceeded.174 As already mentioned above, 
the Guidelines will be revised with the aim of better reflecting the objectives of the European 
Green Deal.175  
 
3.3. When Article 107 TFEU does not apply 
 
3.3.1. The cumulative criteria are not met  
 
Before studying which national fiscal measures in the field of environmental policy fall 
within the scope of State aid control, it is appropriate to clarify when they do not. The first 
of such cases is an obvious one: State aid rules do not apply when the measure at issue does 
not meet all the cumulative criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU, according to which: 
“any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the internal market”. It is settled case-law that the categorisation as ‘State 
 
173 De Cecco, 2013, p. 48-49. 
174 EEAG, Section 2, paras. 20-21. 
175 See, Communication from the Commission, Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, COM(2020) 21 final, p. 
12, Communication from the Commission concerning the prolongation and the amendments of, inter alia, the 
Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020, C/2020/4355, OJ C 224, 
8.7.2020, p. 2–4. 
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aid’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU requires all the four conditions to be satis-
fied.176 The criteria may be broken down as follows: there must be 1) an intervention by the 
State or through State resources, which 2) confers a selective advantage on the recipient,  3) 
is liable to affect trade between Member States, and 4) is liable to distort or threaten to distort 
competition.177 For the purposes of this dissertation, the assessment of the latter two points 
will be combined, and the assessment of the second point is split into two. 
 
The criteria are applied based on objective factors178, which means that national measures 
are assessed on grounds of their effects, not their objectives or the forms they take179, as 
already mentioned above. The concept of State aid is therefore broad and encompasses not 
only subsidies but also positive benefits in various forms, which one way or another release 
undertakings from costs they would normally bear and are thus similar to subsidies in char-
acter and effect180, including fiscal measures such tax exemptions and reductions.181 How-
ever, even if one of the four conditions discussed below is not met, Article 107(1) TFEU 
does not apply.  
 
The prohibition laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU concerns only the activities of undertak-
ings, which have been broadly defined as entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless 
of their legal status or the way in which they are financed. It is the nature of the activity 
which matters.182 For instance, an entity that is formally a part of public administration may 
be regarded as an undertaking if it carries out an economic activity.183 Hence, State aid rules 
also apply to the activities of the State when it engages in economic activity.184 
 
176 C-706/17, Achema and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, para. 46 and case-law cited. 
177 See, for instance, Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, para. 58, C-438/16 
P, Commission v France and IFP Énergies nouvelles, ECLI:EU:C:2018:737, para. 108, C-203/16 P, Andres 
(faillite Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, para. 82, C-150/16, Fondul 
Proprietatea, ECLI:EU:C:2017:388, para. 13, C-20/15 P, Commission v World Duty Free Group, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, para. 53, C-39/14, BVVG, ECLI:EU:C:2015:470, para. 24.   
178 C-83/98 P, France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:248, para. 25.  
179 Bacon, 2013, p. 20-22, see also, Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, 
para. 64, C-452/10 P, BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:366, para. 100.  
180 See, for instance, C‑143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para. 38, C‑78/08 to C‑80/08, Paint Graphos and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 
45; C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, para. 71, C-518/13, Eventech, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, para. 33.  
181 C-78/08, Paint Graphos and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, paras. 45-46. See also Bacon, 2013, p. 23.  
182 C-262/18 P, Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, ECLI:EU:C:2020:450, paras. 27-29, Joined 
Cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:873, para. 103 and case-law cited. 
183  See Commission Notice on the Notion of State aid, 2016, Section 2.1.  
184 C-118/85, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, paras. 7-8, C-343/95, Calì & Figli v Servizi 
Ecologici Porto di Genova, ECLI:EU:C:1997:160, paras. 16-18.  
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Consequently, the basic rule is that if a public entity exercises an economic activity which 
can be separated from the exercise of public powers, it acts as an undertaking in relation to 
that activity and may be subject to State aid control in that regard.185  
 
The differentiation between the exercise of public powers and economic activity is done on 
a case-by-case basis by assessing whether those activities, by their nature, aim and the rules 
to which they are subject to, have an economic character which justifies the application of 
competition rules.186 For instance, the GC has held that whereas the control and supervision 
of air space are typically the activities of a public authority, using an instrument which in-
creases the landing accuracy of an aircraft and thus allows a safer landing plays no part in 
this control and thus contributes to the delivery of the services offered in a competitive con-
text and thus forms a part of an economic activity.187 On the other hand, the fact that the 
entity concerned may be able to seek profits and is engaged in a certain amount of competi-
tion does not automatically mean that it engages in economic activity, as the assessment is 
done based on all the elements characterising its activity.188  
 
Another question relating to indirect environmental taxes such as VAT and excise duties, 
which are meant to tax consumption, is whether exemptions or reductions therefrom can be 
considered granting an advantage to an undertaking if the direct beneficiary of the measure 
is the consumer.189 However, it appears that the Commission generally considers that such 
scenarios result into an indirect advantage conferred upon undertakings providing goods or 
services subject to the reduction, as reduced prices are likely to increase their demand.190 
The fact that the direct recipient of the advantage is a natural person does not prevent its 
classification as State aid.191 
 
 
 
185 See, for instance, T-53/16, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:943, 
para. 107, C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, ECLI:EU:C:2017:496, para. 44. 
186 C-687/17 P, Aanbestedingskalender and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2019:932, paras. 15-16.  
187 T-818/14, BSCA v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:33, paras. 99-106, 117. 
188 C-262/18 P, Commission v Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, ECLI:EU:C:2020:450, paras. 37-39, 47-50 and 
case-law cited. The ECJ set aside the judgement of the GC in T-216/15, Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa v Com-
mission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:64.  
189 For discussion, see Englisch, 2013, p. 9, 12-14. 
190 See Commission Notice on the Notion of State aid, 2016, Section. 4.3 paras. 115-116. 
191 C-403/10 P, Mediaset v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:533, para. 81. 
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3.3.2. The discharge of services of general economic interest  
 
Under Article 106(2) TFEU, both public and private undertakings entrusted with the opera-
tion of services of general economic interest (SGEI) remain subject to the competition rules 
contained in the Treaties, in so far as their application does not obstruct the performance of 
the tasks assigned to them.192 In order to qualify as SGEI, the service at issue cannot be 
satisfactorily provided by the market and must be addressed to citizens or be in the interest 
of society.193 It is established case-law that State compensation for the provision of SGEI is 
exempted from State aid control when it fulfils the so-called Altmark criteria194, although it 
is also possible that a measure which does not meet the Altmark criteria is nevertheless con-
sidered compatible with the internal market on grounds of Article 106(2) TFEU.195 
 
Services of this kind relate in particular to areas of social security, health care, and educa-
tion196, but in some instances it is well-founded to include certain services in the field of 
energy into this category, too, for instance when they aim at ensuring the security of sup-
ply.197 It has been argued that a broad reading of Article 106(2) TFEU could also encompass 
environmental protection services198, but examples of such cases have not yet materialised. 
One may wonder whether services, which are in fact detrimental to the environment, may 
be considered as services in the interest of the society light of the prevailing legislative 
framework and ecological realities. It appears that the answer is positive, in fact the GC has 
stated that the Commission has no obligation to assess the compatibility of aid schemes 
which do not pursue environmental protection objectives with EU environmental protection 
rules199, as discussed in Chapter 5 below. 
 
192 It should be noted that State aid to public services in the field of transport, which is critical in terms of the 
emissions reductions targets, is assessed under 93 TFEU, as it is lex specialis in relation to Article 106(2) 
TFEU. See Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 86.  
193 Verouden and Stehmann, 2016, p. 87.  
194 C-280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, ECLI:EU:C:2003:415, paras. 89-93. Ac-
cordingly, Article 107(1) TFEU does not apply if the compensation is for a clearly defined SGEI service, the 
terms of compensation are established in advance in a transparent and objective manner, the compensation 
does not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs incurred, also considering a reasonable profit, and when 
not chosen by public tender, the level of compensation must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the 
costs of a typical well-run company. See also De Hauteclocque et. al,, 2018, p. 284-285, Bovis et. al., 2016, 
p. 92-94. 
195 T-354/05, TF1 v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:66, para. 140. See also Nowag, 2017, p. 95-96. 
196 See Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, 2012/C 8/02. 
197 De Hauteclocque et. al., 2018, p. 277. See for instance case T-57/11, Castelnou Energía v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:102. 
198 Nowag, 2017, p. 96-97.  
199 T-57/11, Castelnou Energía v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021, para. 187. 
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3.3.3. Block Exemption Regulation and the Energy Taxation Directive  
 
The Commission Block Exemption Regulation 651/2014/EU (GBER)200 exempts certain 
categories of aid from the notification obligation when they are considered compatible with 
the internal market under Article 107(3) TFEU under certain conditions.201 Section 7 thereof 
addresses certain categories of aid for environmental protection.202 The categories of aid 
contained therein are broad, and the regulation therefore lightens the administrative burden 
of Member States when they wish to pursue certain environmental objectives by means of 
State aid. However, the specific conditions of application for each type of aid are rather 
complex, and the application of the GBER is also limited by thresholds prescribed for in 
Article 4 thereof. 
 
It is important to differentiate between tax measures covered by the GBER and those that 
are examined under Article 107(1) TFEU and the EEAG, as only the latter are studied in this 
dissertation. In this context, Article 44 GBER deserves closer examination. Accordingly, aid 
schemes in the form of reductions in environmental taxes fulfilling the conditions of the ETD 
shall be compatible with the internal market, provided that the beneficiaries are selected on 
the basis of transparent and objective criteria and that they pay at least the respective mini-
mum level of taxation set by the ETD. In fact, about three quarters of all GBER measures 
fall within the scope of Article 44.203 For the purposes of clarification, the following classi-
fication may be used204:  
 
1) tax reductions which concern harmonised taxes within the scope of the ETD, and 
which respect the minimum levels laid down therein → assessment based on the 
GBER; 
 
 
200 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1–78. 
201 Article 3 of the GBER.  
202 According to Article 2(101) GBER, environmental protection means ‘any action designed to remedy or 
prevent damage to physical surroundings or natural resources by a beneficiary's own activities, to reduce 
risk of such damage or to lead to a more efficient use of natural resources, including energy-saving measures 
and the use of renewable sources of energy’. This broad definition includes measures addressing climate 
change. See Maillo, 2017, p. 5. 
203 State aid Scoreboard, 2019, p. 41-43.  
204 Sandberg, 2018, p. 79-80. It should be noted that as laid down in Article 26(2) ETD, also tax measures 
under the ETD may constitute State aid. This is the case when they are not within the scope of the GBER and 
are granted at the discretion of the Member States, based on Articles 5 and 15–17 ETD. In this regard, see 
Ezcurra, 2016, p. 209. 
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2) tax reductions covered by another harmonisation directive respecting the thresholds 
laid down therein → assessment based on the EEAG; notification obligation applies; 
 
3) tax reductions which concern non-harmonised taxes or taxes which do not respect 
the minimum limits laid down in a harmonisation directive → assessment based on 
the EEAG; notification obligation applies. 
 
As already mentioned above, the ETD has been criticised for discrepancies, and also the 
Commission has acknowledged that it contains several inconsistencies which hamper the 
attainment of the EU’s energy, climate and transport objectives.205 One of such disparities is 
that not all tax benefits falling within the scope of Article 44 GBER in reality serve objec-
tives of environmental protection.206  
 
3.3.4. De Minimis aid and de jure compatible aid 
 
A measure is also exempted from State aid control when it falls within the scope of applica-
tion of the Commission Regulation 1407/2013/EU on de minimis aid.207 The de minimis 
Regulation exempts certain categories of aid which are deemed to have no impact on com-
petition and trade in the internal market from the notification obligation to the Commission 
under Article 108(3) TFEU, and therefore from the application of Article 107(1) TFEU, too. 
The regulation applies to aids which are granted over a period of three years to a single 
undertaking and constitute a maximum of EUR 200 000.208 
 
In addition, Article 107(2) lays down three de jure derogations to the general prohibition of 
State aid. Accordingly, a) aid having a social character granted to individual consumers, b) 
aid to repair the damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, and c) aid 
granted to the economy of certain areas of Germany affected by the division of Germany, 
shall be compatible with the internal market. The Commission has no margin of discretion 
 
205 SWD(2019) 329 final. See also COM(2019) 177 final, p.6. 
206 See, for instance, Ezcurra, 2017, p. 17. 
207 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 1–8. 
There is also a SGEI specific de minimis Regulation (EU) No 360/2012, OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8–13. 
208 See recital 3 and Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013.  
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with regard to the compatibility assessment once it has verified that the requirements laid 
down in the applicable subparagraph are met.209  
 
Given all the above, it is not an overstatement to say that the applicable framework for State 
aid in the field of environmental taxation is complex and somewhat inconsistent. 
  
 
209 Ianus et. al., 2016, p. 234-235. 
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4. THE CUMULATIVE CRITERIA OF ARTICLE 107(1) TFEU  
 
4.1. State origin:  Imputability to State and State resources  
 
The first cumulative criterion under Article 107(1) TFEU is that a measure may constitute 
State aid when it is granted by a Member State or through State resources. Even though the 
wording of the provision would imply that the two conditions are alternative, they are in fact 
cumulative.210 It is settled case-law that State aid control applies when the aid is granted 
directly or indirectly through State resources and is attributable to the State.211 According to 
the CJEU, the distinction between the two conditions is intended to bring both advantages 
which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body desig-
nated or established by the State within that definition.212   
 
4.1.1. Imputability to State 
 
It is important to differentiate the role of the State as public authority and as an entity which 
may engage in economic activities, as imputability to State is assessed differently in these 
two scenarios. Because this dissertation focuses on fiscal aid measures by which States may 
pursue environmental policy objectives, the focus will be the first point and the actions of 
the State as a regulator.   
 
In order to assess whether a measure is imputable to State it is necessary to examine whether 
public authorities were involved in the adoption of that measure.213 Quite obviously, 
measures, such as fiscal measures, which are adopted by means of laws or government res-
olutions as a rule satisfy this condition.214 However, this is not the case when the measure 
 
210 T-351/02, Deutsche Bahn v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:104, para. 103. See also Schöning and Ziegler, 
2018, p. 17, Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 65. 
211 C-706/17, Achema and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, para. 47, C-262/12, C‑329/15, ENEA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 20, Vent De Colère and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 16, C-126/01, 
GEMO SA, ECLI:EU:C:2003:622, para. 24, C-482/99, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, para. 
24. 
212 See, for instance, Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun v Bodo Ziesemer, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:97, para. 19, and Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160, para. 58, C-
677/11, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE, ECLI:EU:C:2013:348, para. 26. 
213 C-262/12, Vent De Colère and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 17, C‑329/15, ENEA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 21, Case C-706/17, Achema and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, para. 48. 
214 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 71, Bacon, 2013, p. 68. See also C-706/17, Achema and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, para. 49, C-262/12, Vent De Colère and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, paras. 17-18, 
C(2013) 4424 final, Commission Decision of 18.12.2013 on State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – 
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results from the implementation of an act of EU law which imposes a clear and precise ob-
ligation which leaves no margin of discretion to Member States.215 Therefore, tax advantages 
forming an integral part of the standard tax system established by an EU directive or regula-
tion should fall outside State aid control. On the other hand, whenever the measure in ques-
tion is a result of implementation of EU law which entails a margin of discretion, or the 
measure is permissible under EU law but not required by it, it may be imputable to the 
State.216 For instance, measures undertaken on the basis of the Effort Sharing Regulation 
2018/842/EU  are not within the exemption of implementation of EU law, as it is binding in 
terms of the objectives to be achieved but not in terms of the means used to achieve them.217 
There is no alterative with this respect; in order to respect both the division of competences 
between the Member States and the EU as well as the integration principle laid down in 
Article 11 TFEU, the Member States must be able to decide on the practical execution of the 
measures needed to attain the targets laid down at EU level in line with their respective 
economic, environmental and social conditions. On the other hand, this means that State aid 
control and the associated notification obligation cannot be escaped by arguing that the 
measure in question is not imputable to the Member State concerned because it has the ob-
jective of reducing emissions in line with obligations laid down in EU law. 
 
There are, however, some environmental tax exemptions which result from an EU measure 
which leaves no margin of discretion, such as Article 14(1)(b) of the ETD, which lays down 
a harmonised tax exemption for energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purpose of 
air navigation, which therefore falls outside the scope of State aid control.218 This has been 
identified as a significant shortcoming, as kerosene remains one of the only fossil fuels that 
are untaxed regardless of the environmental impacts of aviation. Consequently, the Com-
mission has taken note of the fact that the current exemption contradicts with the 
 
Germany – Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users, para. 
81. 
215 C-460/07, Puffer, ECLI:EU:C:2009:254, para. 70, T-351/02, Deutsche Bahn v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:104, para. 102. 
216 Maqueda and Conte, 2016, p. 253, Englisch, 2013, p. 14-15. See also C-272/12 P, Commission v Ireland 
and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:812, paras. 30, 36, C(2009)10745, Commission Decision of 23.12.2009 on 
State aid SA.25172, NN 63/2009 (ex N 83/2008) – Slovak Republic –  Tax advantage applied on electricity, 
coal and natural gas, para. 32. 
217 Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 
2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement, OJ L 156, 
19.6.2018, p. 26–42. 
218 See Ezcurra, 2016, p. 209. 
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decarbonisation objectives of both EU transport and climate policy and plans to embark on 
introducing a tax on kerosene.219  
 
4.1.2. State resources  
 
Only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources can constitute State 
aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.220  It is settled case-law that the prohibition 
of State aid covers both aid granted directly by the State, including its bodies of central, 
regional and local administration, and aid granted through a public or private entity ap-
pointed or established by the State to administer it.221 Hence, also the resources of public 
undertakings may be regarded as State resources where the State is capable of directing their 
use by exercising its dominant influence over such undertakings.222 However, not all forms 
of public ownership or control automatically fall under State aid control, but actual exercise 
of that control must be shown in order to establish imputability.223 The concept of State is 
thus broad in the context of Article 107(1) TFEU, and so is the concept of State resources, 
which covers measures ranging from grants, investments and loans to granting preferential 
access to a public domain.224 After explaining the general rules of interpretation of the con-
cept, its application to fiscal measures and actions of the State as a regulator are discussed. 
 
General remarks 
 
The existence of State resources has been interpreted in two ways in the case-law of the 
CJEU: the functional interpretation covers every transfer of resources that is in some way 
determined by the State, emphasising the effects of the intervention, whereas the narrower, 
more literal interpretation necessitates a financial burden on the State budget.225 The private 
nature of the funds does not in itself rule out the possibility to classify them as State 
 
219 Commission Staff Working document, evaluation of the Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 
2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, SWD(2019) 
329 final, p. 54. See also Parliamentary questions: Introduction of a European Union tax on kerosene, 
17.12.2019, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-004459_EN.html. 
220 C-82/77, Van Tiggele, ECLI:EU:C:1978:10, paras. 25-26. 
221 Raitio, 2016, p. 604-606. See also C-78/76, Steinike & Weinlig, ECLI:EU:C:1977:52, para. 21, C-262/12, 
Vent De Colère and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 20, C‑329/15, ENEA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 
23 and C-706/17, Achema and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, para. 50.  
222 C‑329/15, ENEA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 31 and case-law cited. 
223 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 71, C-482/99, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, para. 52. 
224 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 68-69. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, point. 3.2.1. 
225 Iliopoulos, 2018, p. 20, Bacon, 2013, p. 61-62. 
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resources, as also the degree of intervention of the public authority in the definition of the 
measure in question and its financing methods matters.226 What is important is whether the 
measure entails a burden on public resources either in the form of expenditure or reduced 
revenue227, or if the funds in question are under public control and available to the competent 
national authorities.228  
 
The CJEU has sometimes relied on the existence of State control, sometimes on the burden 
on State budget, and sometimes both in its reasoning. It appears that since the ECJ’s land-
mark judgement in case PreussenElektra, the interpretation of the condition has been more 
literal as its fulfilment has as a rule required a direct or indirect effect on State budget.229 In 
this judgement, the ECJ held that an obligation imposed by a Member State on private elec-
tricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
at fixed minimum prices did not involve any transfer of State resources to undertakings 
which produced that type of electricity.230 The rationale is to exclude the consequences 
which result from an inherent feature of a legislative provision from the scrutiny under Ar-
ticle 107 TFEU.231  
 
The ruling has however been subject to criticism due to its formalism, as it may in principle 
allow Member States to circumvent State aid control by imposing regulatory obligations 
which transfer the financial burden entirely on private parties but nevertheless affect the 
market.232 On the other hand, necessitating a transfer of State resources stricto sensu could 
be more in line with the division of competences between the EU and the Member States, 
and also allow for more flexibility in the design of regulatory measures aimed at reaching 
 
226 T-139/09, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:496, paras 63-64. See also C(2018) 3166 final, Com-
mission Decision of 28.5.2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/c) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany 
for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 StromNEV, para. 126. 
227 Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2000:585, para. 116-117, Joined Cases 
C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:175, para. 99.  
228 C‑329/15, ENEA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 25, C-677/11, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole 
UKL-ARREE, ECLI:EU:C:2013:348, para. 35, C-328/99, Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:252, para. 33. 
229 Raitio, 2016, p. 606-611. A similar narrow approach has also been applied in cases such as T-182/10, 
Aiscat v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:9, C-222/07, UTECA, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124 and C-518/13, 
Eventech, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9.  
230 See Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160, paras. 58-60.  
231 Ibid, para. 62 and case-law cited.  
232 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 66, Talus, 2013, p. 142. 
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environmental objectives.233 Nevertheless, in its more recent case-law, the ECJ has not al-
ways necessitated an actual effect on State budget for concluding that State resources are 
involved. Instead, it appears that the level of intervention and control of the public authorities 
over the funds in question is another determining factor in the assessment of State resources 
within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.234 
 
In fact, the prevailing rule is that regulation which foresees financial redistribution from one 
private entity to another without any involvement of the State does not entail a transfer of 
State resources, but a transfer of State resources is present if the funds transit through a 
public or private entity designated by the State with a view of administrating the aid.235 
Hence, the origin of the resources is not relevant provided that they come under public con-
trol and are available to the national authorities before being transferred to the beneficiar-
ies.236 For instance, funds financed through compulsory charges imposed by legislation and 
used in accordance with it may be regarded as State resources even if they are managed by 
entities separate from the public authorities, if a public body acts as an intermediary at some 
stage of the process.237 On the other hand, State resources are not present when an entity is 
not appointed by the State to manage a State resource, but has recourse to its own financial 
resources when complying with obligations imposed by the State. This is the case when the 
extra costs incurred cannot be passed on entirely to end users and are not financed by a 
compulsory contribution imposed by the State or by a full offset mechanism.238 Therefore, 
the mere fact that the advantage is not financed from the State budget as such is not sufficient 
to exclude that State resources are involved.239 For instance, in case Achema and Others, the 
 
233 See Opinion of AG Maduro in C-237/04, Enirisorse, ECLI:EU:C:2006:21, paras. 45-50, where he sug-
gests that the selectivity test would be better in identifying the measures which should fall within the prohibi-
tion of State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU instead of limiting the scope of the State resources criterion to 
those affecting State budget, as it would ensure that only legislative measures which result in preferential 
treatment fall within State aid control. 
234 Maqueda and Conte, 2016, p. 221-224. 
235 C-706/17, Achema and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:407, para. 52, 70, C-262/12, Vent De Colère and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:85, para. 19, 35, and C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:413, para. 74.  
236 C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:413, para. 70. See also C-262/12, Vent De 
Colère and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 21, T-25/07, Iride and Iride Energia v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2009:33, paras. 25-28. 
237 See, for instance, C-262/12, Vent De Colère and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 25, C-405/16 P, 
Germany v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2019:268, para. 58. 
238 C‑329/15, ENEA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 30. See also C(2018) 3166 final, Commission Decision of 
28.5.2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/c) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consum-
ers under Paragraph 19 StromNEV, para. 133. 
239 C-482/99, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, para. 36, C-399/10 P, Bouygues and Bouygues 
Télécom v Commission and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:175, para. 100, C-262/12, Vent De Colère and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para. 21, C‑329/15, ENEA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:671, para. 25. See also C(2018) 3166 
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ECJ held that a support mechanism for the provision of certain public interest services in the 
electricity sector involved State resources, since the life cycle of the funds was strictly reg-
ulated and they remained under the control of the State, without even mentioning the word 
‘budget’ in its assessment.240 It may also be noted that a tax can also constitute an integral 
part of an aid scheme when it is hypothecated to an aid measure under national legislation.241 
 
The ECJ has further elaborated the criteria for establishing State control in its ruling in case 
Germany v Commission (EEG). It held that the fact that public authorities exercised domi-
nant influence over the funds in question was not enough to establish State control, because 
it was not shown that the State was entitled to dispose of those funds or to decide on their 
allocation. Public monitoring of the action is thus not sufficient if it does not entail control 
over the funds themselves. The mere fact that the funds at in question are managed in ac-
cordance with legislation and for the purposes laid down therein is neither sufficient for 
establishing State resources.242 This ruling is welcomed from a policy perspective, as it 
makes clear that legislative schemes imposed and monitored by the State are not as such 
under State control as understood in the context of Article 107(1) TFEU. When assessing 
the effect on State budget, on the other hand, the ECJ has specified that it is necessary to 
establish a sufficiently direct link between the advantage given and a reduction of the State 
budget or at least a sufficiently concrete economic risk of a burden on that budget.243  
 
Hence, it appears that aid measures escape State aid control when they are administered and 
collected by private parties which are not under the dominant influence of the State in the 
sense that the State could affect the use of the funds in question or have resource to them, 
and when there is no burden or a risk of a burden on State resources. Whenever there is a 
State-controlled intermediary which also controls the distribution of the funds, they are likely 
considered to involve State resources.244  
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Fiscal measures 
 
The ECJ has consistently held that the concept of aid embraces not only positive benefits, 
such as subsidies, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are 
normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being sub-
sidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.245  This 
is particularly the case with tax advantages, which do not entail any direct expenditure of 
State resources, but which do entail a loss of revenue that would otherwise have accrued and 
may place the recipients of the aid in a more favourable position than other taxpayers.246  
 
Therefore, tax exemptions or reductions247 from or asymmetrical application248 of environ-
mental taxes which place some undertakings in a more favourable financial situation than 
others as a rule qualify as transfer of State resources, as the link between the measure in 
question and State budget is in principle always present.249 Also more general measures such 
as an advantageous determination of tax base may fulfil the State resources criterion under 
the same logic.250 This is because even if the measure at issue would be in principle neutral 
and not even be aimed at raising revenue, it in the end leads to a loss of earnings to the 
detriment of the State budget251, if some undertakings in a comparable factual and legal sit-
uation are taxed but not others. Hence, tax legislation which grants certain undertakings ex-
clusion from the obligation to pay a particular tax satisfies the criteria of State resources, 
since it involves the renunciation by the authorities concerned of tax revenue which they 
would normally have received.252 It should  be noted that the fact that losses incurred on the 
State due to the measure in question may in some instances be compensated by other incomes 
 
245 See, for instance, C-672/13, OTP Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2015:185, para. 40, C-518/13, Eventech, 
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ECLI:EU:C:2006:197, para. 42, C-387/92, Banco Exterior de España v Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 
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indirectly resulting from that measure does not prevent the fulfilment of the State resources 
criterion.253 
 
State as regulator 
  
As may be concluded from above, the leeway Member States enjoy in the design of MBI 
falling outside State aid control is rather limited, although some room for manoeuvre exists. 
The NoX judgement serves as a illustrative example with this respect to the stricter approach, 
where the ECJ held that an emissions trading scheme involved State resources, because the 
tradable emissions allowances therein resulted from emissions standards laid down by the 
State free of charge. The logic is the same as already explained –  the possibility of trading 
those allowances entailed market value, and granting them to undertakings free of charge  
instead of selling or auctioning them could be equalised to a loss of State revenue.254 The 
ECJ expressly stated that “foregoing of resources cannot be considered as ‘inherent’ in any 
instrument designed to regulate emissions of atmospheric pollutants by an emission allow-
ance trading scheme,” because when the State has recourse to those instruments, it also has 
a choice on how to allocate those allowances.255  
 
However, recent jurisprudence of the ECJ may open room for a more flexible approach. 
Nicolaides has argued that the ECJ’s judgement in Eventech, which concerned privileged 
access to public infrastructure (the use of bus lanes by London black taxis but not mini cabs), 
would have confirmed that when States act as regulator, they in fact do not have to auction 
rights which have economic value nor necessarily even charge any fees, as long as its justi-
fied on grounds of the public policy objective in question.256 This more permissive approach 
in terms of justifying the loss of State revenue could be feasible in terms of environmental 
cases, as drafting regulatory measures which entail foregoing State revenue is inevitable in 
order to reach the binding climate policy targets. However, this would not mean that State 
aid control would seize to apply, but that the criterion of State resources would not neces-
sarily be fulfilled in case the loss of revenue was deemed justified.  
 
 
253 Ibid., paras. 55-58, Kingston, 2012, p. 392.  
254 C-279/08 P, Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, para. 107. 
255 Ibid., para. 111. 
256 Nicolaides, 2018, p. 7. See also C-518/13, Eventech, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9.  
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Importantly, not all instances were State foregoes revenue due to a legislative choice qualify 
as State aid under the current framework, either. This may be the case when it is established 
that the State acts as a regulator which pursues public policy objectives by making the se-
lection process of the undertakings concerned subject to qualitative criteria, drafted in line 
with the objective in question and established ex ante. When the State acts as a regulator, it 
can thus decide legitimately not to maximise its revenues which it could otherwise have 
received without falling under the scope of State aid rules, provided that all the undertakings 
concerned are treated in line with the principle of non-discrimination, and that there is an 
inherent link between achieving the regulatory purpose and the foregoing of revenue. In 
doing so, it acts in a so-called genuinely regulatory capacity.257  
 
This is what differentiates between State as regulator and State as a market operator – regu-
latory actions do not need to aim at the maximation of revenue and thus the market operator 
principle is not applicable in this context. What matters is whether State foregoes revenue, 
but as stated, that fact alone is not necessarily sufficient to conclude that the measure entails 
State resources. In line with the ECJ’s judgement in case Eventech: “the identification of the 
objective pursued is, in principle, a matter within the prerogative of the competent national 
public authorities alone and they must have a degree of discretion both as regards whether 
it is necessary, in order to achieve the regulatory objective pursued, to forgo possible reve-
nue and also as regards how the appropriate criteria for the granting of the right.”258  
 
Of course, some regulatory environmental measures may completely fall outside State aid 
control, too. In fact, the axiom is that generally applicable regulations do not include the use 
of State resources.259 However, whenever a regulatory measure is under the scrutiny of Ar-
ticle 107(1) TFEU, it appears established case-law that the (environmental) objective of that 
measure plays no role in this assessment.260 As mentioned before, the ECJ has emphasised 
that Article 107(1) TFEU defines State interventions on the basis of their effects and inde-
pendently of the techniques used. Nevertheless, an indirect negative effect on State revenues 
 
257 Commission Notice on the Notion of State aid, 2016, Section. 3.2.1 para 54. See also C-518/13, Eventech, 
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stemming from regulatory measures does not constitute a transfer of State resources where 
it is an inherent feature of the regulatory measure in question.261 The link between taxation 
and State budget is a rather obvious one and hence the State resources criterion is rarely 
questioned in cases concerning fiscal aid for environmental protection. Instead, selectivity 
is the decisive criterion for determining the existence State aid in these cases. 
 
4.2. Selectivity  
 
The issue of selectivity represents the most important and controversial criterion for the as-
sessment of fiscal State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU, as it raises complex issues both with 
respect to its interpretation and the limits of national regulatory autonomy in the fiscal do-
main.262 It is often the decisive criterion in the classification of a fiscal measure as State aid, 
as the other criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU are almost always satisfied in these 
cases.263 A prominent issue is that the notion of material selectivity has been interpreted 
broadly in the case-law of the CJEU, due to which there have been few tax measures escap-
ing the classification as State aid under 107(1) TFEU and thus the notification obligation 
laid down in Article 108 TFEU.264 In addition, too broad an understanding of the selectivity 
criterion may risk the division of competences between the Member States and the EU.265 
 
The assessment of selectivity requires the determination of whether, under a particular legal 
regime, a national measure is such as to favour certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods over other undertakings which are in a comparable factual and legal situation 
in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, and who accordingly suffer different 
treatment which can be classified as discriminatory.266 The aim is to exclude general regu-
latory measures which apply equally to all undertakings in all economic sectors in a Member 
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State, such as most nation-wide fiscal measures, from State aid control.267 Hence, general 
regulative measures which do not favour certain undertakings over others should fall outside 
the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, even if they were in principle able to have distortive 
effects on competition. Nevertheless, fiscal measures and even fiscal systems which have 
seemed general by nature have often been considered selective in the case-law of the 
CJEU268, and the definition of general measures in this context is narrow; neither the number 
of eligible undertakings nor the diversity or size of the sectors to which those undertakings 
belong provide any grounds for concluding that a measure is a general means of economic 
policy.269 Hence, the number of beneficiaries does not matter – in principle, a measure may 
be selective even if it concerns a whole economic sector.270 The difficulty is that tax 
measures typically have, in addition to the general goals such as the collection of State rev-
enue, both macroeconomic aims (addressing economy-wide phenomena) and micro-eco-
nomic aims (addressing a specific industry or activity), and only the former may be linked 
with the State’s general economic policy, whereas the latter is linked with other policy ob-
jectives such as environmental ones and is thus linked with selectivity.271 
 
It has been argued that the CJEU’s strict adherence to the effects-based approach means that 
there are in fact very few scenarios where a tax measure may fall outside the scope of Article 
107 TFEU, and therefore the interpretation of the selectivity criterion also manifests itself as 
a political battle between the Member States and the Commission about the scope of State 
aid control in the fiscal domain.272 Perhaps due to this critique, the ECJ has clarified some 
rules of interpretation with respect to the assessment of selectivity which limit the scope of 
State aid control, such as the fact the assessment of selectivity cannot be presumed on formal 
grounds but presupposes both familiarity with the content of the applicable provisions and 
examination of their scope on the basis of existing administrative and judicial practice.273  
 
It should be repeated that in addition to measures such as tax exemptions and reductions, a 
tax itself can be selective when its scope is narrow, as the imposition of a tax only on some 
 
267 Verouden and Stehmann, 2016, p. 35.  
268 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 129-130. 
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of the undertakings in a comparable situation may have the same effect as an exemption 
from an existing tax.274 The assessment of selectivity is more simple in cases where a tax 
exemption is explicitly granted to some undertakings only – the challenge is identifying the 
selective nature of taxes which appear general but in fact do not apply uniformly to all un-
dertakings.275 This division between general measures and aid measures is significant, as it 
is decisive in terms of the room for manoeuvre of Member States in the design of their public 
policy measures.276 
 
As mentioned above, regardless of the fact that fiscal policy falls within the exclusive com-
petence of the Member States, that competence must be exercised in accordance with EU 
law. Therefore, it is not surprising that the CJEU has consistently held that already the use 
of discretion which enables national authorities to determine whether or not to include some 
groups of undertakings in a particular scheme may be considered selective, if the decision 
criteria are unrelated to the tax system itself, but concern other policy objectives.277 Instead, 
the use of discretion may be justified if it is limited to verifying the necessary conditions for 
the pursuit of the tax objective in question and the criteria are both objective and inherent in 
the tax system.278 Selectivity may be material or regional, both of which will be discussed 
next below.  
 
4.2.1. Material selectivity 
 
According to the Commission, material selectivity is the application of a measure only to 
certain undertakings or certain sectors of the economy in a Member State. De jure selectivity 
results directly from the legal criteria for granting the measure, which restricts its scope to 
certain undertakings only, whereas de facto selectivity may be established where the formal 
criteria for the application of the measure are general and objective, but the structure of the 
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measure is such that its effects favour a particular group of undertakings.279 The latter type 
of selectivity is usually the one presenting most issues in the assessment of fiscal measures.  
 
The parameter against which material selectivity of fiscal measures is assessed is the national 
fiscal system –   in order to classify a national measure as selective, first the ordinary or 
‘normal’ tax system applicable in the Member State concerned must be identified. Second, 
it must be demonstrated that the tax measure in question is a derogation from that system in 
so far as it differentiates between undertakings who are in a comparable factual and legal 
situation in the light of the objective pursued by the tax system.280 However, where the Mem-
ber State concerned is able to demonstrate that that differentiation between undertakings 
flows from the nature or general structure of the system of which the measures forms a part, 
it is justified and falls outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.281 This is the so-called 
‘three-step test’: 1) identifying the system of reference, 2) derogation therefrom, and 3) pos-
sible justification. 
 
The ‘three-step test’ is relatively well-established but its practical implementation is not 
without problems; several advocate generals have pointed out in their recent opinions that 
especially the identification of the relevant reference framework is challenging when it 
comes to legal certainty in particular.282 It has also been argued that the application of the 
test shifts the debate on selectivity towards formal matters283, although the only decisive 
factor, according to the well-established effects-based approach, should be the effects pro-
duced by the measure.284 On the other hand, it has been acknowledged that some level of 
legal uncertainty is inherent in the application of the test, which includes the determination 
of a rule and exception on a case-by-case basis, but that a certain flexibility is necessary in 
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order to ensure the appropriate scope of State aid control with respect to fiscal measures.285 
What is clear is that the rules of application of the test and the interpretation of material 
selectivity remain ambiguous.286 For the purposes of clarity, I have chosen to examine each 
step individually, although they are closely intertwined.  
 
a) Identification of the reference framework 
 
The determination of the reference framework plays a significant role in the assessment of 
material selectivity, since the very existence of an advantage may be established only when 
compared with the ‘normal’ scheme taxation.287 However, the definition of the concept is 
ambiguous; it consists of the set of rules that generally apply, based on objective criteria, to 
all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective. Typically, those rules 
define the scope of the system, the conditions under which it applies, and the rights and 
obligations of undertakings subject to it.288 With respect to taxes, such indicators may be 
elements such as the chosen tax base, rate, or the taxable event.289 The characteristics of the 
undertakings may be decisive, too, as the reference framework can be circumscribed around 
energy-intensive industries only, for instance. The definition of the reference framework has 
important practical consequences in terms of the burden of proof as it forms the basis against 
which the Commission must show that there is a derogation therefrom, after which the Mem-
ber State concerned may show that the derogation is justified.290 The reference framework 
constituting normal taxation against which the comparison assessment is made may be the 
tax itself291, the applicable regulation of which the measure forms of a part292 or the general 
scheme of which the measure forms a part293.  
 
It appears that initially the Commission tended to opt for a broad definition of the reference 
framework and consequently presume of derogation therefrom on formal grounds. However, 
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since the ECJ’s judgement in Paint Graphos, establishing selectivity necessitates a more 
detailed consideration and finding material discrimination between similar situations and not 
merely an exception to an alleged general rule.294 Hence, it is not always necessary that a tax 
measure should  derogate from an ordinary tax system in order to be considered selective, 
but when a derogation is present, it creates a presumption of selectivity at least in terms of 
individual measures. Instead, when examining a general aid scheme, it is necessary to iden-
tify whether the measure in question confers an advantage to the exclusive benefit of certain 
undertakings only.295 The regulatory technique used does not matter. For instance, when the 
objective of a specific provision is to charge profits, it forms a part of the general scheme of 
taxation the objective of which is the taxation of profits, even though some undertakings 
would be charged under a different provision than others. Hence, the fact that a specific tax 
is charged differently between two categories of undertakings does not mean that they could 
not be in a comparable factual and legal situation in the light of the objective pursued.296  
 
General availability test and discrimination test 
 
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe has identified two types of tests applied by the ECJ for the defini-
tion of the reference framework. The so-called ‘general availability test’ as applied by the 
ECJ in its judgement in case Gibraltar presupposes that advantages resulting from a general 
measure applicable without distinction to all economic operators do not constitute State aid 
within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.297 According to this test, all undertakings do 
not actually have to enjoy the advantage concerned, but they must be able to benefit from 
it.298 Even when the measure in question is conceived as a general aid scheme and not as an 
individual aid measure, it may be selective if it confers that advantage exclusively on certain 
undertakings or certain sectors of activity.299  
 
Subsequently, the ECJ appears to have slightly departed from this test and put emphasis on 
the so-called ‘discrimination test’, which presupposes an examination of whether the 
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measure applies to undertakings in a non-discriminatory manner, in its ruling in case World 
Duty Free Group.300 Discrimination is established when there is a different treatment of 
equivalent situations or an equivalent treatment of different situations.301 Hence, it is not 
necessary discriminatory to exclude some undertakings from the scope of the measure if they 
are not in an equivalent situation with those subject to it.302 In its judgement in World Duty 
Free Group, the ECJ departed from view of the GC, who had held that in order to establish 
selectivity with regard to measures which are a priori accessible to any undertaking, it is 
always necessary to identify a particular category of undertakings who are exclusively fa-
voured by the measure.303 The ECJ noted that such a supplementary requirement for the 
identification of a particular category of undertakings cannot be derived from its case-law – 
what matters is whether certain undertakings are excluded from the benefit of an advantage 
in a manner which constitutes discrimination.304 With this respect, the ECJ also narrowed 
the scope of application of the Gibraltar judgement, where it had held that selectivity neces-
sitates the identification of a privileged category of undertakings, because in that case there 
was no derogation from the reference framework unlike in the case at hand.305  
 
One may conclude that in line with the effect utile of EU law, the ECJ quite consistently 
emphasises de facto selectivity – what matters are the effects of the measure, which may 
favour certain undertakings, and therefore lead to de facto discrimination against undertak-
ings who are in a comparable situation in the light of the objective pursued. This is in line 
with the effects-based approach, according to which the objective or the regulatory technique 
by which the system is designed do not matter.306 It is now established case-law that the 
examination selectivity of a measure is coextensive with the examination of whether it ap-
plies to that set of economic operators in a non-discriminatory manner.307 Only tax 
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advantages resulting from a general measure applicable to all economic operators without 
distinction clearly fall outside the scope of State aid control.308  
 
It has been argued that the ‘discrimination test’ is problematic in terms of both legal certainty 
and the regulatory autonomy of Member States in fiscal matters. AG Saugmandsgaard Øe 
has pointed out that adherence to it entails an assessment of selectivity afterwards, by com-
paring the situation of undertakings which benefit from the advantage because they chose to 
adopt the conduct targeted, with the situation of undertakings which do not benefit from it 
because they have not done so.309 It may also be argued that this sets the bar for a measure 
to qualify as selective quite low, especially when the reference framework is defined 
broadly.310 However, it may also be argued that this approach is consistent with the nature 
of fiscal measures, as tax regimes are often introduced by regulation framed in a general 
manner. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the wording of the tax provision in question 
in order to assess whether or not it confers a selective advantage.311 In addition, since the 
judgement in Paint Graphos, the reference framework must be determined materially and 
discrimination assessed both de jure and de facto, which imposes some limits on its defini-
tion – the system of reference should only include undertakings who in fact are in a compa-
rable factual and legal situation. This materially defined reference system is more likely nar-
rower than a formally defined one.312 Selectivity is not automatically established if a measure 
applies exclusively to a specific economic sector or a group of undertakings, but it has to 
have the effect of conferring an advantage on certain undertakings over others.313 
 
General tax system or special tax regime 
 
In a more pragmatic and simple manner, one may also argue that the ECJ generally opts 
between the following types of reference frameworks: the general tax system or the special 
tax regime. All undertakings are subject to the general tax system, such as the corporate 
income tax system, as a result of which any deviation is more easily considered selective. 
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The main objective of the general tax system is to raise revenue, and therefore, exception to 
its application may only be justified by the guiding principles of the tax system. Hence, there 
is no room for the consideration of external policy objectives in this context. On the other 
hand, with respect to special tax regimes, such as taxes on energy consumption, the external 
objectives of the tax measure in question may be considered in the definition of the reference 
system.314 This classification appears to be the one applied by the Commission in the assess-
ment of derogation from the reference framework.315 It should be noted that the fact that a 
tax has a budgetary objective cannot preclude its categorisation as a special-purpose levy as 
such, since every tax pursues a budgetary purpose, too.316 
 
The ECJ’s judgement in Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Em serves an example of a case where the 
tax itself constituted the reference system. The case concerned a national duty levied on 
nuclear fuels used for the commercial production of electricity. The applicant had argued 
that the duty in question was a part of a regime for the taxation of energy sources used to 
produce electricity or for the taxation of energy sources used to produce electricity not emit-
ting CO2 emissions. With respect to this framework, different treatment of undertakings 
could have been shown because energy sources other than nuclear fuel used for the produc-
tion of electricity were not taxed. However, the ECJ considered that it was not possible to 
identify a tax regime which has as its objective the taxation of energy sources used to pro-
duce electricity or energy sources used to produce electricity which do not contribute to 
CO2 emissions.
317 In this regard, the ECJ followed the opinion of AG Szpunar, who held that 
it is not possible to identify a system of reference which would take account of all the pos-
sible production processes of electricity (combustion of fossil fuels, nuclear reaction, renew-
able sources of energy etc.). Therefore, the reference framework cannot be the general sys-
tem of taxation of electricity, as no such system exists – the duty in question constituted a 
special tax which could only be applied to the nuclear sector.318 
 
The ECJ also took account of the objectives of the measure, which were environmental as 
the tax revenues were to be used for the rehabilitation of the mining site where radioactive 
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waste from the use of nuclear fuel was stored. Therefore, as undertakings using other meth-
ods to produce electricity do not generate radioactive waste, they were not in a comparable 
factual and legal situation in the light of the objective pursued by the measure, either. Hence, 
the duty on the use of nuclear fuel for the commercial production of electricity was not se-
lective and did not constitute State aid.319  
 
It appears that the environmental purpose of the tax was drawn from the link between the 
structure of the tax and the use of revenues for rehabilitating the mining site, which was the 
reason why the levy was qualified as a special tax under which environmental objectives 
may be considered. García and Ferreiro Serretargue argue that this conclusion is in line 
with the judgement of the ECJ in Transportes Jordi Besora:  a link between the structure of 
the tax and the use of the tax revenues has to exist in order to identify the tax as an environ-
mental tax.320 In this regard, they refer to Pitrone, according to whom it is not sufficient that 
the objective of the tax is to discourage environmentally-harmful action or the use of prod-
ucts harmful to the environment, but the structure of the tax must be specifically designed to 
attain such an objective. One example of such a design is to establish a direct link between 
the use of the revenue and the non-budgetary purpose of the protection of the environment.321 
Therefore, whenever tax revenues arising from a special-purpose levy are earmarked for a 
concrete environmental objective, the tax should not qualify as a State aid under Article 
107(1) TFEU, provided that its structure is in line with the objective in question and it would 
cover all undertakings in a comparable and factual situation in the light of that objective.  
 
García and Ferreiro Serretargue argue that this exemption should apply only when the ma-
jority of the tax revenue is allocated for environmental purposes. They criticise the ECJ’s 
judgement in Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Em with this respect, as the tax revenues of the measure 
in question were used both for environmental purposes and to cover other expenses, but the 
ECJ held that the underlying logic of the duty was nevertheless environmental. They there-
fore promote for a more factual consideration of the distribution of the revenue in order to 
ensure that the main objective of the measure is indeed environmental. Otherwise, it could 
be argued that the use of tax revenues for an environmental purpose in any proportion, as 
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long as its structure is tailored to that objective, would be enough to classify the tax as a 
special-purpose levy.322  Hence, they promote requiring a link between the structure of the 
tax and the use of (majority of) the tax revenue for the environmental purpose.  
 
Importantly, however, establishing a direct link between the use of revenue and the structure 
of the tax is only one way of showing that the tax is specifically designed to attain an envi-
ronmental objective. According to Pitrone, this is also apparent from the judgement in 
Transportes Jordi Besora. Another scenario is when there is a link between the structure of 
the tax and its incentive effect, which may be sufficient for its categorisation as a special-
purpose levy, when the structure of the tax, particularly the taxable item or tax rate, incen-
tivises the desired behaviour.323 In fact, according to AG Wahl, what matters is the non-
budgetary purpose of the tax where it is set at a level which discourages or encourages certain 
behaviour, for instance when its level varies according to the adverse environmental effects 
of the taxed product or activity. Hence, to the extent that the structure of the tax shows that 
it serves a specific purpose, the fact that the revenue collected may be put to any use should 
not preclude its classification as a special-purpose levy.324 
 
In my opinion, the application of both lines of interpretation presented above on a case-by-
case basis allows the Member States to utilise special-purpose levies in a manner which sets 
an appropriate balance between the requirements of State aid control and those stemming 
from Article 11 TFEU and the division of competences. It is difficult to draw arguments 
from the case-law of the CJEU which would justify the narrower approach, according to 
which only taxes whose majority revenue would be earmarked for environmental protection 
purposes could be categorised as special-purpose levies.  
 
It has also been argued that allowing the consideration of environmental objectives with 
regard to special-purpose levies only may tempt the Member States pursue national policy 
objectives through special regimes which may be more easily justified rather than through 
derogations from general tax schemes.325 This could result in asymmetrical treatment of ad-
vantages provided in the context of special taxes and general taxes, and arguably create a 
bias in favour of special taxes. Hence, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe has advocated for the 
 
322 García; Ferreiro Serret, 2016, p. 837. 
323 Pitrone, 2015, p. 64, C-82/12, Transportes Jordi Besora, ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para. 32. 
324 Opinion of AG Wahl in C-82/12, Transportes Jordi Besora, ECLI:EU:C:2013:694, paras. 23-25. 
325 Piernas Lopez, 2018, p. 279. 
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possibility of considering environmental objectives in the context of general taxes, too. He 
argues that although mere reliance on a legitimate objective cannot as such exclude a State 
measure from the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, it should be possible to rely on any legiti-
mate objective in assessment of the reference framework and comparability in particular.326  
 
The suggestion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe has potential for the promotion of the applica-
tion of the integration principle in a more coherent manner. It could also bring balance into 
the application of State aid rules, where currently the majority of tax measures are considered 
selective, by allowing Member States to define the applicable reference framework for any 
type of tax measure on the basis of its environmental objectives, which might then escape 
State aid control if deemed well suited to achieve the objective in question, and all the under 
takings in a comparable situation in the light of the objective are subject to the measure. 
However, should the consideration of environmental objectives in the context of general 
measures be stretching it too far, in my opinion the fear of mala fide application of the ex-
emption provided under special-purpose levies may nonetheless be largely eliminated on 
account of the requirements relating to the link between the structure of the tax and the its 
incentive effect or use of revenue. 
 
Finally, it has been argued that save for manifest errors, the reference framework as defined 
by the national legislator should be accepted as starting point, and the Commission and the 
CJEU could depart from it only when necessary to avoid abuses of the Member States' lee-
way, notably through the use of regulatory techniques.327 This would naturally respect the 
fiscal autonomy of the Member States and again allow for more flexibility in the use of fiscal 
tools for the attainment of environmental objectives without jeopardising the objectives of 
State aid control. Nevertheless, the identification of the reference framework is not decisive 
but only the first of the three steps – what matters in the end is the examination of the differ-
ence in treatment in the light of the objective pursued.328  
 
 
326 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-374/17, A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:741, paras. 152-
158. For arguments against allowing the consideration of external policy objectives in the case of derogations 
from general systems (mainly the effects-based approach and the objective definition of the concept of State 
aid), see Piernas Lopez, 2018, p. 279-280. 
327 Piernas Lopez, 2018, p. 278. 
328 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-236/16, ANGED, ECLI:EU:C:2017:854, para. 88, C-20/15 P, Commis-
sion v World Duty Free Group, ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, paras. 54, 67 and 74.  
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b) Derogation – differentiation of undertakings which are in a comparable factual and 
legal situation in the light of the objective pursued  
 
The second step is the determination of whether, with regard to the objective pursued by the 
system in question, it constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings as compared with 
others which are in a comparable legal and factual situation in the light of the objective 
pursued by the reference system.329 This step therefore allows the consideration of objectives 
in the assessment of material selectivity regardless of the fact that State aid law is character-
ised by the effects-based approach.330 Simply speaking, derogations from the reference sys-
tem are not selective if the undertakings, products or activities which are not taxed are ob-
jectively different to those taxed, or when the non-taxation derives from the logic or structure 
of the tax system. For instance, non-polluting activities are exempted from anti-pollution 
levies because their logic is to penalise polluting activity.331 
 
This stage, like the other two, is characterised by some level of subjectivity and ambiguity, 
as there are no predefined criteria which would define how to identify the undertakings sub-
ject to comparison and what a ‘comparable situation’ in fact means.332 One issue is also that 
the CJEU has in some cases conducted the assessment in the light of the objective pursued 
by the particular measure in question333, and in some cases, in the light of the objective 
pursued by the system of which the measure forms a part334, which is problematic as drawing 
a comparison in the light of the objective of the system (i.e. taxing company profits) or in 
the light of the objective of the measure (i.e. taxing energy consumption) is not the same and 
may result in different outcomes.335 The choice between the two depends on the determina-
tion of the reference framework as explained above. In the light of recent case-law, AG 
Hogan considers that the material delimitation of the reference framework should be 
 
329 See, for instance, C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para. 41, C-88/03, Portugal v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para. 54, C-20/15 
P, Commission v World Duty Free Group, ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, para. 57, C-164/15 P, Commission v Aer 
Lingus, ECLI:EU:C:2016:990, para. 51.  
330 Bartosch, 2011, p. 181. 
331 Nicolaides, 2017, p. 70. 
332 Micheau, 2015, p. 333-334. 
333 See, inter alia, C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para. 41, C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:757, para. 
79, T-219/10 RENV, World Duty Free Group v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:784, para. 127. 
334 See, inter alia, C-308/01, GIL Insurance and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2004:252, para. 68, C-78/08, Paint 
Graphos and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 54, C-20/15 P, Commission v World Duty Free Group, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, para. 57. 
335 Micheau, 2015, p. 335-337. See also De Cecco, 2013, p. 108, Ezcurra, 2016, p. 215-216. 
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determined in view of the subject matter covered by the tax from which the measure in ques-
tion constitutes a derogation, not the measure itself. In this context, all the rules dealing with 
that subject matter, not only the tax from which the measure derogates, should be consid-
ered.336 Nevertheless, it appears that the case-law of the CJEU remains unclear with this 
respect, it has for instance referred to both the objective of the tax system and objective of 
the tax itself even in the same judgement.337   
 
The landmark case in the assessment of comparability in the light of the objective of the 
measure is the ECJ’s ruling in Adria-Wien, where it held that the ecological considerations 
underlying the national legislation in question did not justify treating the consumption of 
natural gas or electricity by undertakings supplying services differently than undertakings 
manufacturing goods, because energy consumption by each of those sectors was equally 
damaging to the environment.338 Hence, although the measure was considered selective, the 
ECJ acknowledged that environmental objectives may be the benchmark against which com-
parability is assessed. It could be deduced from the judgement that in the case of environ-
mental aid measures, undertakings are in a comparable factual and legal situation if their 
activities are equally damaging to the environment. Therefore, it would not be discriminatory 
if a group of undertakings, who are in a different situation because their activities have dif-
ferent impact on the environmental objective pursued, are treated differently. This could be 
the case when a specific category of undertakings having a low impact on the environment 
would be granted a tax exemption, for instance.339  
 
AG Geelhoed has used taxation of newly produced vehicles without a catalyser as an exam-
ple with this respect, which, according to this line of reasoning, would not be selective due 
to the fact that undertakings producing environmentally-friendly vehicles are not in a com-
parable factual and legal situation with undertakings producing vehicles without a catalyser 
in the light of the objective of reducing pollution. He has pointed out that although a national 
measure of general nature may have undesirable consequences from an economic perspec-
tive, from a policy (and in my opinion, legal) point of view, classifying such measures as 
 
336 Opinion of AG Hogan in Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:395, para. 80. 
See also C-374/17, A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:741, paras. 36-37. 
337 See Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, paras. 61 and 65. 
338 C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para. 
52. 
339 Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 83. 
62 
  
State aid may limit the Member States’ opportunities to use fiscal measures as a legitimate 
policy instrument within the competences conferred on them.340  
 
According to Kingston, the requirement that the measure in question should be applied to all 
activities which have a comparable impact on the environment in order for the measure not 
to be considered selective is problematic, as all environmental tax measures by their nature 
and logic entail a choice to tax a particular type of pollution or activity. As individual fiscal 
aid measures virtually never apply to all activities having a similar environmental impact, 
they would always be subject to the notification obligation under Article 108 TFEU, unless 
falling within the scope of application of the GBER.341 However, at least when the reference 
framework is the tax itself, the comparison with regard to impacts on the environment is 
done in the light of its specific objectives342, which makes it more feasible and targeted. As 
cases like Kernkraftwerke shows and as explained below, measures which are aimed at tax-
ing a particular pollution or activity may not be selective.   
 
After the ECJ’s ruling in Adria-Wien, the GC appeared to be more willing to consider non-
economic objectives in the assessment of selectivity. The famous case with this respect is 
British Aggregates, which concerned a levy imposed on so-called ‘virgin aggregates’ ex-
tracted from nature, whereas recycled aggregates were exempted from the levy, because they 
were more environmentally-friendly. Here, the GC held that in the absence of harmonisation, 
Member States may retain their powers in relation to environmental policy, and thus to in-
troduce sectoral environmental levies in order to attain their respective policy objectives. It 
continued by noting that Member States are free, in balancing the various interests involved, 
to set their priorities as regards the protection of the environment and to determine which 
goods or services should be subject to an environmental levy, and concluded that the levy in 
question was not selective.343 The GC also referred to Article 11 TFEU by stating  the Com-
mission must take account of the environmental protection requirements referred therein 
when assessing an environmental levy in the context of State aid, as well as the PPP.344 
 
 
340 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in C-308/01, GIL Insurance and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:481, paras. 75-76.  
341 Kingston, 2012, p. 397-398. 
342 See Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, paras. 65-67. 
343 T-210/02, British Aggregates v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:253, paras. 115, 156. 
344 Ibid, paras. 117, 136-137. 
63 
  
However, the ECJ rejected the ruling of the GC because it held that it did not respect the 
effects-based approach.345 The ECJ did reaffirm that the Commission must take  environ-
mental protection requirements referred to in Article 11 TFEU into account in its assessment, 
but emphasised that the need to take account of those requirements, however legitimate, 
cannot justify the exclusion of selective measures from the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, 
as they may be considered when the assessing the compatibility of the State aid measure 
with the internal market is assessed pursuant to Article 107(3) TFEU.346  
 
Regardless of the ECJ’s ruling in British Aggregates, GC suggested in case Netherlands v 
Commission (NOx) that ecological considerations could justify distinguishing undertakings, 
in this case between those emitting large quantities of NOx from others, and thus be consid-
ered as an inherent feature of the reference system.347 However, the ECJ again rejected this 
argument.348 It may therefore be argued that since the judgement of the ECJ in British Ag-
gregates and NOx, the standing of environmental objectives as a justification for different 
treatment between undertakings with respect to material selectivity appears weak. Regard-
less, it appears that both the ECJ and the Commission have subsequently allowed some room 
for the consideration of environmental objectives in the assessment of selectivity, and thus 
departed from strict adherence to the effects-based approach.  
 
The Commission has, in line with the case-law of the CJEU, taken a stance on the standing 
of environmental objectives in the justification for different treatment in its Notice on the 
Notion of State aid from year 2016. Accordingly, the comparison between the undertakings 
is to be done in the light of the intrinsic objective of the system of reference, whereas exter-
nal policy objectives — such as regional or environmental — cannot be relied upon by the 
Member State to justify the differentiated treatment.349 In my opinion, one could argue that 
the Commission may have taken a shortcut when interpreting the case-law in a manner which 
automatically categorises all environmental objectives as external policy objectives. It ap-
pears to base this conclusion on judgement of the ECJ in case P Oy, which in fact concerned 
the exercise of discretion of tax authorities. In the paragraph referred to by the Commission, 
 
345 Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:757, paras. 85-87. 
346 Ibid, paras. 90-92. See also opinion of AG Mengozzi in C-487/06 P, British Aggregates v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:419, para. 102, and Kingston’s critique thereof, Kingston, 2012, p. 398. 
347 T-233/04, Netherlands v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2008:102, paras. 97-99. 
348 C-279/08 P, Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, paras. 75-78.  
349 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid, 2016, Section 5.2.3.2. para 135. 
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the ECJ stated that ‘when competent authorities have a broad discretion to determine the 
beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided on the basis 
of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as maintaining employment, the exercise of that 
discretion must then be regarded as favouring ‘certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods’.350 The distinction between intrinsic and external objectives itself was already 
established in case Portugal v Commission (Azores), where the ECJ held that when assessing 
the guiding principles of the tax system, a distinction must be made between the objectives 
attributed to a particular tax scheme which are extrinsic to it and the mechanisms inherent in 
the tax system itself which are necessary for the achievement of such objectives.351 However 
the conclusion that environmental considerations may never be considered as guiding prin-
ciples of the tax system is difficult to draw directly from the wording of these two judge-
ments, if the legal framework of the system is drafted in a manner which closely links its 
structure with environmental objectives.352  
 
Importantly, however, the Commission explicitly allows the considerations of environmen-
tal objectives as a justification for difference in treatment with respect to special-purpose 
levies imposed to discourage certain activities or products that have an adverse effect on the 
environment. In such cases, different treatment of activities or products whose situation is 
different does not necessarily constitute a derogation.353 The Commission thus appears to 
allow different treatment of undertakings if it results from the application of a special envi-
ronmental tax measure which is closely structured around the objective of the protection of 
environment. On the other hand, the ability to rely on environmental objectives is precluded 
in the context of general taxes, as discussed above.354 It should however be noted that the 
CJEU has found that also requirements stemming from EU secondary law may justify the 
difference in treatment of prima facie similar situations.355  
 
 
350 C-6/12, P Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2013:525, para. 27 and case-law cited. 
351 C-88/03, Portugal v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para. 81. See also C-78/08, Paint Graphos and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 69. 
352 See Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in C-374/17, A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:741, para. 150, 
where he argues that according to the reading of the relevant case-law, in order to be considered as ‘intrinsic’ 
to the reference framework, the tax scheme must be closely structured around the legitimate objective of pro-
tection of the environment. 
353 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid, 2016, Section 5.2.3.2. para 136. 
354 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-374/17, A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:741, para. 151. 
355 De Cecco, 2013, p. 106-107. See T-475/04, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:196, C-431/07 P, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2009:223 
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A recent example of the ECJ’s assessment of comparability is its preliminary ruling in case 
ANGED, which concerned certain regional taxes raised on large retailers but not on small 
shops due to the traffic congestion caused by the large retailers. The purpose of that tax was 
to contribute towards environmental protection as well as town and country planning. Here, 
the ECJ started by referring to the Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, according 
to which Member States are free to decide on the economic policy which they consider most 
appropriate and to spread the tax burden as they see fit in accordance with EU law.356 Im-
portantly, it continued by stating that the environmental impact of retail establishments is 
indeed largely dependent on their size, and therefore, distinguishing between undertakings 
with a greater or lesser environmental impact with this respect is consistent with the objec-
tives pursued by the measure in question.357 Somewhat peculiarly, the ECJ pointed out next 
that the setting up of retail establishments is of particular significance for town and country 
planning policies, and therefore, a condition under which the imposition of a tax is based on 
the sales area of an undertaking differentiates between undertakings that are not in a compa-
rable situation in the light of the objectives pursued. Then, it simply stated that a tax exemp-
tion received by the retail undertakings whose sales area was under the applicable threshold 
did not constitute a selective advantage.358 This judgement is noteworthy in the sense the 
ECJ again acknowledged that environmental considerations may justify a difference in treat-
ment between undertakings, although they were not the decisive factor in this case.  
 
The ECJ’s judgement in case UNESA serves perhaps the most recent example of both the 
definition of the applicable reference framework and derogation therefrom in the field of 
environmental taxes. The case concerned the lawfulness of a Spanish tax on the use of inland 
waters to produce electricity. The rationale of the tax derived from EU environmental direc-
tives which require the protection of water sources as well as the sustainable use of water, 
based on which Spain levied four different taxes in order to internalise the environmental 
costs arising from the use of inland waters for electricity production. The assessment of ma-
terial selectivity related to one issue in particular: the tax did not apply to electricity gener-
ated from other sources of energy than water.359  
 
 
356 C-233/16, ANGED, ECLI:EU:C:2018:280, para. 51.  
357 Ibid., paras. 52-53. 
358 Ibid., paras. 54-56. 
359 Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935.  
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Here, the ECJ applied the tax measure itself as the reference framework. It stated that alt-
hough the chosen tax criterion (the tax base relating to the source of production of electricity) 
does not appear to derogate from the reference framework, its effect is to exclude electricity 
producers whose source of production is other than water from its scope. It continued by 
referring the effects-based approach due to which it cannot be excluded a priori that the 
criterion of imposing the tax on the use of inland waters enables an advantage to be given 
by mitigating the tax burden of undertakings which are not subject to that tax. Therefore, the 
reference framework covered both undertakings subject to the tax and undertakings using 
other energy sources for the production of electricity.360 The ECJ continued by assessing the 
comparability of the undertakings concerned in the light of the objective pursued by the 
inland water tax as expressed in national law – the protection and improvement of public 
water resources. Because the aim was to protect water resources and not all natural resources, 
electricity producers not using water were not in a comparable factual and legal situation 
with those using water in the light of the objective pursued.361 Hence, there was no different 
treatment between undertakings in a comparable factual and legal situation and the tax was 
not selective. This judgement, along with ANGED, confirms that environmental objectives 
can be the benchmark against which the comparability of undertakings is assessed at least in 
case of special-purpose levies.  
 
Finally, the ECJ also appears to consider taking a step-back with regard to negative harmo-
nisation perhaps as a result of the critique of the EU’s ‘creeping competence’362 in fiscal 
matters. It repeats that in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it falls within the tax 
competence of the Member States to designate bases of assessment and to spread the tax 
burden across the various factors of production and economic sectors, and consequently, as 
a rule, opt for a criterion for taxation connected with a particular base or activity.363  
 
c) Justification by the nature or general structure of the tax system  
 
The third stage of the three-step test is the possibility conferred upon the Member States to 
escape State aid control by demonstrating that that the difference in treatment is justified 
since it flows from the nature or general structure of the system of which the measure forms 
 
360 Ibid., paras. 63-65.  
361 Ibid. paras. 66-67.  
362 On creeping competence, see, for instance, Lovdahl-Gormsen, 2019, p. 92-97.  
363 Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, paras. 68-69. 
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a part.364 The conditions of application are strict – the Member State concerned must show 
that the measure in question is the direct result of the founding or guiding principles of the 
reference system or necessary for its functioning.365 This necessitates showing that the meas-
ure is consistent with the inherent characteristics of the tax system and the manner in which 
that system is implemented.366 It appears that such inherent characteristics may only be fac-
tors which in the strict sense relate to the functioning of the fiscal system, such as the pro-
gressive nature of taxation or fiscal neutrality.367 Since the ECJ’s judgement in Paint 
Graphos, the measure must also be proportionate, i.e. appropriate for attaining the objective 
concerned and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it, in order to be able to benefit from 
the justification.368 It has been argued that this creates confusion and unnecessary overlap, 
as the requirement of proportionality already applies in the assessment under Article 107(3) 
TFEU.369 
 
The Commission expressly states that it is not possible to rely on external policy objectives 
which are not inherent to the system as a justification.370 Unlike in the assessment of different 
treatment in the light of the objective of the measure, there is no explicit exception which 
would allow the consideration of external policy objectives with regard to special-purpose 
levies. Hence, it appears that there is little or no room for environmental considerations at 
this stage. For instance, the Commission has not considered tax exemptions relating to the 
ETS to be justified by the nature and logic of the system, as it viewed the ETS as a part of 
the national legal system instead of the national fiscal system.371 However, the possibility 
 
364 See, inter alia, C-374/17, A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1024, para. 44, C-203/16 P, Andres (faillite 
Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, para. 87, C-20/15 P, Commission v World 
Duty Free Group, ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, para. 58, C-417/10, 3M Italia, ECLI:EU:C:2012:184, para. 40. On 
the burden of proof, see C-159/01, Netherlands v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:246, para. 43, C-279/08 P, 
Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, para. 62. 
365 T-251/11, Austria v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1060, para. 117, C-78/08, Paint Graphos and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 69.  
366 C-78/08, Paint Graphos and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 73. 
367 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 139, T-219/10, RENV - World Duty Free Group v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:784, paras. 170-172. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Sec-
tion 5.2.3.3. para. 139 and Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation, 1998, para. 24. 
368 C-78/08, Paint Graphos and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 75. It should be noted that some have 
questioned whether the appropriateness of the measure is required under this proportionality assessment, as 
the ECJ expressly mentions the condition of necessity only (see Szudoczky, 2016, p. 377). However, in my 
view, requiring adherence to the principle of proportionality itself entails the requirement of appropriateness. 
369 Buendia Sierra, 2018, p. 91.  
370 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 5.2.3.3. para 138.  
371 Sandberg, 2018, p. 68-69. See, for instance, 2009/972/EC, Commission Decision of 17 June 2009 on aid 
scheme C 41/06 (ex N 318/A/04) which Denmark is planning to implement for refunding the CO2 tax on 
quota-regulated fuel consumption in industry, OJ L 345, p. 18–27, paras. 38 and 40-45. 
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that the CJEU would interpret the inherent characteristics of the system in question to include 
environmental objectives in the future cannot be excluded. 
 
Considering the above, it may be concluded that most room for environmental considerations 
in the assessment of material selectivity appears to be found in the assessment of existence 
of differentiated treatment in the light of the objective pursued by special-purpose levies. In 
fact, AG Hogan argues that the CJEU only considers the objective of the measure in the 
determination of selectivity when the reference framework is pursuing a specific objec-
tive. By contrast, when the main objective of a tax measure is raising State revenue, the 
CJEU, although sometimes referring to ‘objectives’, determines the framework by reference 
to its broader subject matter.372 Hence, the definition of the reference framework plays a key 
role, as external objectives appear to be considered only when it is designed to pursue a 
specific objective of environmental protection.  
 
4.2.2. Alternative approaches 
 
It has been argued that strict adherence to the effects-based approach and the broad interpre-
tation of the notion of material selectivity have resulted into excessive State aid control at 
the expense of the ability of the Member States to pursue their legitimate public policy ob-
jectives by regulatory means. Hence, it has been suggested that an alternative reading of the 
selectivity criterion could strike a balance between safeguarding competition and the com-
petences of the Member States.373 However, the more flexible the interpretation becomes, 
the more challenges it poses with respect to legal certainty, which sets limits to the extent to 
which opposing objectives may be reconciled.374 The premise of the following discussion is 
that EU competition law should not be a closed system, but instead should seek coherence 
with other fields of EU law.375   
 
The approach undertaken by the ECJ rulings such as British Aggregates and NOx, which 
adhered to strict effects-based approach, prevailed for several years. However, after rulings 
such as Kernkraftwerke, ANGED and UNESA, as well as the guidance provided in the 
 
372 Opinion of AG Hogan in Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:395, para. 87. 
See also C-236/16, ANGED, ECLI:EU:C:2018:291, para. 40. 
373 See, inter alia, Szudoczky, 2016, p. 370, Bartosch, 2010, p. 751. 
374 Raitio, 2018, p. 490. 
375 See, by analogy, Raitio, 2018, p. 493-495. 
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Commission’s notice in year 2016, it appears that environmental objectives may still have a 
role to play in the assessment of material selectivity especially in the definition of the refer-
ence system and derogation therefrom. Hence, the debate on which should prevail: the ef-
fects-based approach, the objectives-based approach, or something in between, is still ongo-
ing.  
 
It may be argued that the effects-based approach is more in line with the principle of legal 
certainty, as the identification of the ‘main’ objective pursued always entails a value choice, 
because most tax provisions pursue several objectives simultaneously. As AG 
Saugmandsgaard Øe puts it, giving preference to some objectives to the detriment of oth-
ers may entail a risk of an arbitrary choice being made.376 On the other hand, if one interprets 
the wording of Article 107(1) TFEU in the context of other Treaty provisions, the require-
ments for environmental protection laid down therein as well as the integration principle laid 
down in Article 11 TFEU may warrant a redefinition of the effects-based approach.377 AG 
Bobek has suggested an approach which may allow the consideration of requirements stem-
ming from both legal certainty and the integration principle. According to him, when as-
sessing the comparability of undertakings, both the scope of application of the measure in 
relation to the undertakings and/or situations it covers and the objective of the measure in 
terms of the objectives it wishes to pursue should be taken into account. He maintains, based 
on the ECJ’s NOx judgement, that environmental objectives may be the objectives against 
which the comparability assessment is made.378 
 
Indeed, several legal scholars have contemplated on the potential of a more objectives-based 
reading of the selectivity criterion in order to better respect the integration principle and the 
division of competences between the Member States and the EU in fiscal matters. Objec-
tives-based approach simply means allowing the consideration of the objective of the meas-
ure in its entirety, be it external or internal, in the assessment of material selectivity.379 Mi-
cheau demonstrates that the objectives-based approach would have led to a different conclu-
sion in British Aggregates, since taxing virgin aggregate would have reduced its demand and 
boost the use of secondary and waste aggregate, which in turn would have led to a decrease 
 
376 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-374/17, A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:741, para. 144. See 
also Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-270/15 P, Belgium v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:289, para. 37. 
377 Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 78-80. 
378 Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-270/15 P, Belgium v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:289, paras. 31-36. 
379 See, for instance, Micheau, 2015, p. 341-343. 
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in the use of non-renewable resources and thus promoted the protection of the environ-
ment.380 The discussion on the objectives-based approach is linked with the discussion on 
the possible need for a ‘rule of reason’ in State aid law, which puts emphasis on the legiti-
macy of the aim pursued by the measure, which could lead to its qualification as a general 
measure rather than a selective one.381  
 
Most scholars discussing the objectives-based approach base themselves on the ideas of Bar-
tosch, who has suggested the following methodology as an alternative for the prevailing 
three-step test: 1) identifying the reference framework, 2) analysing the permissible objec-
tives from State aid control perspective, and 3) assessing whether the measure may be justi-
fied by the nature or general scheme of the reference framework.382 Hence, the test does not 
look that different from the current one. The main difference would be that the second and 
third step would be characterised by a legitimacy assessment similar to that undertaken in 
the context of fundamental freedoms. In practise, this would mean that after establishing the 
reference system, it would be assessed whether the identified derogation therefrom is justi-
fied on grounds of a legitimate objective. Justification would necessitate that the measure is 
not a means of arbitrary discrimination and that it would be appropriate for securing the 
attainment of the objective pursued and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it.383 However, since Paint Graphos, the requirement of proportionality is already embedded 
in the third stage of the analysis.384 In addition, it has been pointed out that convergence with 
the rules on fundamental freedoms would not necessarily lead to a broader range of justifi-
cations under Article 107 TFEU, as the accepted justifications for tax measures in the context 
of fundamental freedoms resemble those accepted under the nature or general structure of 
the tax system.385  
 
It cannot be disputed that the rule of reason approach, when understood as allowing for more 
flexibility in the assessment of the legitimate objective under Article 107(1) TFEU, would 
provide more leeway in the exercise of the national regulatory autonomy in the design of 
 
380 Ibid. 
381 Prek; Lefevre, 2012, p. 340.  
382 Bartosch, 2010, p. 741.  
383 Micheau, 2015, p. 343-344, Szudoczky, 2016, p. 374. 
384 C-78/08, Paint Graphos and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:550, para. 75, by comparison with C-110/05, Com-
mission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66, para. 59. Proportionality is also manifested in the de minimis regula-
tions, as small amounts of aid are not considered that affect the market so significantly that control would be 
needed.  
385 Szudoczky, 2016, p. 372. 
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fiscal measures.386 It is however debatable whether such a change in the established assess-
ment methodology would be feasible as it is, just like the currently applicable three-step test, 
subject to discretionary elements and there would be no guarantee that it would result into a 
more satisfactory outcome than the currently applicable test. In line with De Cecco, the as-
sessment based on the rationale of national legislation risks shifting the definition of State 
aid into a subjective territory and could allow the design of measures that seemingly pursue 
a legitimate objective but are in fact protectionist. Hence, there are grounds for a more pos-
itivist manner that the interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU should remain guided by rule 
of law concerns, such as legal certainty and equality.387 The objectives-based approach 
would open an endless debate on what is legitimate and illegitimate. As Bartosch himself 
notes, State aid control would be deprived of its meaning if Member States were permitted 
to use any political objective in order to argue that a measure is not materially selective.388 
Hence, there ought to be rules which determine how to assess what is in fact legitimate in 
each particular case, which is the aim of the objectives-based approach. It is however not 
possible to list all the legitimate objectives ex ante at EU level, as it would interfere with the 
Member States’ discretion in fiscal matters.389  
 
In my opinion, although attractive from a policy perspective, the other proposals for an al-
ternative reading of material selectivity discussed next are perhaps more feasible for address-
ing the prevailing issues, as they are built on the logic of State aid law itself. It may be more 
in line with the principle of legal certainty to establish rules of interpretation in the context 
of State aid law, which has objectives specific to it, rather than borrowing the assessment 
methods applied in other fields of EU law, which have objectives of their own. For instance, 
the main purpose of the rules governing the fundamental freedoms is to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, whereas State aid law has primarily to do with regulating 
competition between undertakings, not between Member States per se. Hence, it has been 
suggested that it might be more feasible to aim at drafting a set of more objective criteria 
which would predefine the autonomy of the Member States with respect to the design of 
their tax policies instead of moving towards the logic of rule of reason.390 In addition, State 
aid law is characterised by a public governance element as it concerns the actions of the 
 
386 De Cecco, 2013, p. 109. 
387 Ibid., p. 109, 113. 
388 Bartosch, 2010, p. 741. 
389 Micheau, 2015, p. 344-345. 
390 Peters, 2019, p. 13-14.  
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State. Hence, neither the application of the more economic-oriented approach391 similar to 
that applied in the context of Articles 101-102 TFEU, which concerns the actions of under-
takings, would not be without problems.  
 
Another alternative instead of putting emphasis on the objective of the measure, is to focus 
on the tax competences of the Member States, which should allow them to define the appli-
cable reference framework to start with. The framework could be drafted on the basis of 
environmental objectives and the measure could escape State aid control, if it is well suited 
to achieve the aims established by the national legislator, and all the under takings in a com-
parable situation in the light of those objectives are taxed. In fact, this option already exists 
in terms of special-purpose levies. As argued by Piernaz Lopez, this option is in line with 
the effects-based approach as well as the objective definition of the concept of State aid, 
unlike the objectives-based approach. What could not be justified under this logic are dero-
gations from general systems on grounds of external policy objectives.392 This is the line 
currently applied by the CJEU and Commission as explained above.  
 
Furthermore, there are robust arguments which promote a shift to an approach somewhere 
in between of the effects- and objectives-based approach. In my view, some more flexibility 
in terms of the consideration of environmental objectives under Article 107(1) TFEU along 
these lines may be needed in order to not only make it more feasible for the Member States 
to design national measures in line with the binding emissions reductions targets, but also in 
order to set a balance between protection of competition and a reasonable degree of freedom 
of the Member States to pursue public policy goals without being subject to the notification 
obligation pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU.393 
  
Wiesbrock argues that proper integration of environmental considerations at all stages of 
State aid control necessitates explicit consideration of environmental objectives already 
when applying Article 107(1) TFEU on a case-by-case basis. Measures such as general 
 
391 This approach would put emphasis on the definition of the relevant market and competition between un-
dertakings therein. Therefore, if undertakings would not engage in activities in the same market, the tax 
measure granted to undertakings in one market would not have detrimental effects to undertakings in another 
market. This would pose practical problems in terms of application; for instance, a sector-based tax aid 
should be assessed in the light of the tax treatment applicable in all the same sectors in every Member State. 
See Micheau, 2015, p. 344-348. 
392 Piernaz Lopez, 2018, p. 279-280. 
393 With this respect, see Bartosch, 2011, p. 187. 
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exemptions from environmental taxes should fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU 
if they are generally available across sectors in line with objective and predefined conditions. 
Instead, measures which exempt undertakings from the financial burden they would nor-
mally have to bear under the general system of charges confer a selective advantage.394 This 
approach would allow the integration of environmental objectives within the existing frame-
work of State aid law.  
 
Instead of the putting more emphasis on the environmental objectives of the measure as such, 
Nowag suggests emphasising the application of the PPP in the assessment of material selec-
tivity similarly to Wiesbrock: whenever a State measure relieves an undertaking from costs 
it would normally have to bear under the applicable legal framework for environmental pro-
tection, it receives a selective advantage. According to the logic of PPP, a measure escapes 
State aid control when it addresses all undertakings engaged in a particular activity which 
produces certain type of pollution in a consistent manner. Nowag emphasises the fact that 
the rulings of the ECJ such as the British Aggregates do not mean that it rejects the consid-
eration of environmental objectives altogether, but instead rejects the idea that they could as 
such be sufficient to exclude the measure from State aid control. He also replies to the cri-
tique presented by Kingston: the prevailing interpretation of selectivity does not mean that 
each measure should address all activities having a similar environmental impact. Instead, it 
emphasises two points: 1) environmental objectives as such are not sufficient to exclude a 
measure from State aid control395, as the effects of the measure must always be taken into 
account, and 2) the measure must address a particular negative externality stemming from a 
particular activity and all undertakings engaged in that activity in a consistent manner.396 
Therefore, the PPP can be considered as a fundamental feature of the reference system on 
grounds of which differences in treatment may be justified.397 
 
As a matter of fact, it appears that Nowag in a way argues that environmental considerations 
can be taken into account when assessing the effects of the measure – a specific activity 
which does not have the effect of producing a particular negative externality may be treated 
differently than the activities producing it.398 He also emphasises the fact, like Wiesbrock, 
 
394 Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 84-85. 
395 Similarly, Kingston, 2012, p. 399. 
396 Nowag, 217, p. 108-109. 
397 De Cecco, 2013, p. 109-110. 
398 Nowag, 2017, p. 109. 
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that should integration only be allowed to take place under Article 107(3) TFEU, it conflicts 
with the very idea of balancing environmental considerations with other policy considera-
tions at all stages of decision-making as required under Article 11 TFEU.399 Balancing ex 
post should only occur if integration ex ante is not possible, which should also be the most 
efficient option from an economic point of view.400 Integration ex ante is possible if the case-
law of the CJEU is interpreted to prohibit the exclusion of measures from State aid control 
on grounds of their environmental objectives as such, but to nevertheless allow their consid-
eration in the assessment under Article 107(1) TFEU.  
 
What is important is that the ECJ has on many occasions held that the objective of the frame-
work can be environmental protection. Therefore, derogations from that framework must 
applied consistently in the light of the identified aim in order to avoid discriminatory treat-
ment of undertakings; the measure must address all undertakings engaged in the particular 
activity or creating the particular type of pollution in order not to be considered selective. 
Nowag argues that this ‘consistency’ test is in line with the PPP – Member States should aim 
at internalising negative externalities and ensuring that the price of goods and services re-
flects the pollution caused by them.401 De Sadeleer points out that adherence to the PPP and 
Article 11 TFEU should also mean that aid measures which are in principle aimed at the 
protection of the environment but nevertheless pose a threat to it should be prohibited even 
if they would comply with the requirements of competition law. At the same time, aid 
measures which verifiably promote the protection of the environment should be more easily 
approved regardless of their anti-competitive effects, as long as they remain proportional.402  
  
In my view, Nowag’s suggestion would not only promote adherence to the integration prin-
ciple and environmental principles prescribed for in the TFEU but also bring more clarity 
into the assessment of selectivity in the context of environmental measures and thus promote 
legal certainty. Hence, it bears both material and formal value. It also appears to be enforced 
in the recent case-law of the ECJ, for instance in case Kernkraftwerke, the comparability of 
undertakings was assessed in the light of the pollution (radioactive waste) generated.403 On 
 
399 Nowag, 2017, p. 110. See also Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 78-79. 
400 Nowag, 2015, p. 29. 
401 Nowag, 2017, p. 110-111. Nowag also points out that using the PPP as a benchmark for comparability ap-
pears to be supported by the case-law concerning the restrictions on free movement, too.  
402 De Sadeleer, 2014, p. 467. 
403 C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH v Hauptzollamt Osnabrück, ECLI:EU:C:2015:354, paras. 78-
79. 
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the other hand, one may argue that taking the PPP as the guiding principle does not leave 
enough room for manoeuvre in the design of regulatory measures, as the attainment of the 
climate policy objectives demands more than merely internalising the environmental cost in 
prices.404 However, the aid measures paving way to the structural changes needed are un-
likely fiscal by nature. Furthermore, it should be noted that Nowag’s reasoning only provides 
arguments under which a measure may not be considered selective and may thus avoid the 
classification as prohibited aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. Naturally measures which are 
selective must remain under the scrutiny of State aid control and subject to the justification 
assessment ex post under Article 107(3) TFEU.  
 
4.2.3. Geographic selectivity  
 
The notion of geographic selectivity and its application appear to be rather well-estab-
lished405, and it does not provide grounds for environmental considerations as such as it 
concerns issues of division of tax powers within a Member State. Hence, in the context of 
this dissertation, it is appropriate to limit the examination of the concept to a general over-
view. The notion of geographic selectivity covers measures which favour undertakings op-
erating in a specific region.406  
 
First, it should be clarified that selectivity is assessed with respect to undertakings operating 
within the Member State concerned, not between undertakings established in different Mem-
ber States.407 Geographic selectivity, also known as regional selectivity, may be established 
when a measure which is otherwise general in nature is only applied within a certain region 
of a Member State. Therefore, the principal rule is that only measures which apply within 
the entire territory of the Member State may escape State aid control.408 Nevertheless, the 
fact that the applicable reference framework is not defined within the limits of the Member 
State concerned but within the limits of a smaller entity therein does not automatically render 
 
404 See, for instance, Ezcurra, 2014, p. 666. 
405 See, for instance, Bartosch, 2011, p. 176.  
406 De Cecco, 2013, p. 120. 
407 Verouden and Stehman, 2016, p. 36, De Cecco, 2013, p. 41. 
408 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 5.3. para. 142. 
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the measure selective409, if certain requirements derived from the case-law of the CJEU are 
met.410  
 
One important element is the autonomous status of the regional or local authority – if it 
exercises the powers conferred on it by law and enjoys a legal and factual status which makes 
it sufficiently autonomous in relation to the central government of the Member State, the 
central government does not play a fundamental role in the definition of the political and 
economic environment in which the undertakings within that region operate.411 Therefore, if 
a certain regional or local authority is sufficiently autonomous, the tax measures it imposes 
do not meet the criteria of geographic selectivity. This scenario – the asymmetrical devolu-
tion of tax powers – is one of the three scenarios for the assessment of geographic selectivity 
as identified by the Commission. A sufficient level of autonomy necessitates the fulfilment 
of three cumulative criteria of autonomy: institutional, procedural and economic and finan-
cial.412 The guidance for the determination of the criteria is rather well-explained in the Com-
mission’s Notice on the Notion of State aid.413 
 
A second scenario for the assessment of geographic selectivity is the symmetrical devolution 
of tax powers, which means that all regional authorities enjoy the same tax powers inde-
pendently from the central government. In this case, selectivity cannot be established if it is 
not possible to define a common reference framework for all the regions.414 Finally, where 
a measure which is supposed to apply within a defined geographical area is unilaterally de-
cided by the central government of a Member State, it is always selective.415 This is natural 
because the geographic reference framework for the actions of the central government is the 
whole state. 
 
 
409 C-88/03, Portugal v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para. 57, Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06, 
Unión General de Trabajadores de la Rioja, ECLI:EU:C:2008:488, para. 47, C-169/08, Presidente del 
Consiglio dei Ministri, ECLI:EU:C:2009:420, para. 60. 
410 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 5.3. para. 142. See also Bovis et. al., 2016, 
p. 144-146. 
411 Joined Cases C‑105/18 to C‑113/18, UNESA, ECLI:EU:C:2019:935, para. 70, C-233/16, ANGED, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:280, para. 41 and case-law cited. 
412 C-88/03, Portugal v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para. 67, Commission Notice on the Notion of 
State Aid, 2016, Section 5.3. para. 144(3).  
413 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 5.3. 
414 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 144. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 5.3. 
para. 144(2). 
415 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 5.3. para. 144(1). 
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4.3. Economic advantage 
 
The concept of an economic advantage is closely linked with that of selectivity, and some-
times they appear to be combined in the language used by the Commission and the CJEU.416 
However, they are two separate concepts – economic advantage conferred on undertakings 
as such does not constitute State aid unless it is selective by nature.417 Once an advantage 
arising from a particular measure has been identified, it is for the Commission to show that 
it is selective.418 However, in terms of individual aid measures, the fulfilment of the ad-
vantage condition may create a presumption of selectivity.419 In terms of general measures, 
it is for the Commission to establish that although conferring an advantage of general appli-
cation, the benefit of that advantage is exclusively conferred on certain undertakings or sec-
tors. Only tax advantages resulting from a general measure applicable without distinction to 
all economic operators do not constitute aid.420 As mentioned above, in the case of fiscal 
measures, the cumulative criteria are rather easily met with the exemption of selectivity. 
 
Advantage as understood within the context of Article 107(1) TFEU is an economic benefit 
that the undertakings concerned would not have obtained under normal market conditions, 
that is, without State intervention.421 Typically, the advantage must also confer an additional 
burden for the State422, although, as mentioned above in Chapter 4.1.2., fiscal measures 
which mitigate the burden normally included in the budget of the undertaking satisfy the 
State resources criterion.423 An advantage is therefore either a positive economic benefit or 
a relief from costs –  the main point is that it must have economic value.424 Hence, whenever 
 
416 See, for instance, Piernas Lopez, 2018, p. 277. 
417 See, inter alia, T-53/16, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:943, 
para. 162 and case-law cited. 
418 Opinion of AG Wahl in C-15/14 P, Commission v MOL, ECLI:EU:C:2015:32, para. 47, repeated by the 
ECJ in C-15/14 P, Commission v MOL, ECLI:EU:C:2015:362, para. 59. 
419 Kyriazis, 2016, p. 433, C-270/15 P, Belgium v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:489, para. 49, C-15/14 P, 
Commission v MOL, ECLI:EU:C:2015:362, para. 60, T-257/18, Iberpotash v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2020:1, para. 117. 
420 C-203/16 P, Andres (faillite Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, paras. 84-85 
and case-law cited. 
421 Schöning and Ziegler, 2018, p. 9. See C-39/94, SFEI and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, para. 60, C-
140/09, Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo, ECLI:EU:C:2010:335, para. 34, C-579/16 P, Commission v 
FIH Holding and FIH Erhversban, ECLI:EU:C:2018:159, para. 44, T-778/17, Autostrada Wielkopolska v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2019:756, para. 83 and case-law cited. 
422 C-345/02, Pearle and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2004:448, para. 36, Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, Sloman 
Neptun v Bodo Ziesemer, ECLI:EU:C:1993:97, para. 21. 
423 C-399/10 P, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:175, paras. 
100-101. 
424 C-518/13, Eventech, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, para. 47. 
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the financial situation of an undertaking is improved as a result of State intervention, an 
advantage is present. Such an improvement is shown by comparing the financial situation of 
the undertaking as a result of the measure with the financial situation of that undertaking had 
the measure not been granted.425  
 
Tax reductions and exemptions are always the result of State intervention and thus constitute 
a benefit which would not have been available under normal market conditions and which 
has the effect of improving the financial position of the undertakings concerned, therefore, 
the existence of an advantage is rarely disputed in these cases.426 However, there have been 
cases where a tax benefit was not considered to constitute an advantage when the recipient 
undertakings were legally obliged to pass on the whole amount of the tax benefit to their 
customers.427 Nevertheless, exempting such measures whose indirect beneficiaries are con-
sumers from the scope of State aid control appears unlikely today, as the ECJ has stated that 
even if the direct recipient of the benefit is a consumer, it can still constitute indirect aid in 
favour of an undertaking if its effect is to incentive consumers to purchase its products or 
services.428 It would be against the effects-based approach to exempt schemes in which the 
advantage is indirect by nature from State aid control.429 The concept of an advantage is of 
particular importance in the context of SGEI, which will be left out of further examination 
due to the limitations of this dissertation.  
 
An important tool in the assessment of existence of an advantage is the so-called market 
economy operator test, which applies when public authorities engage in economic activity. 
Accordingly, the actions of a public body do not constitute State aid if a private investor of 
a comparable size operating under normal market conditions could have made the same in-
vestment.430 The rationale is that Member States may play a role in economic life by acting 
 
425 See, inter alia, C(2015) 7143 final, Commission Decision of 21 October 2015 on State Aid Implemented 
by the Netherlands to Starbucks, Case SA.38374 (2014/C ex 201 4/NN), "Starbucks", para. 256, C(2015) 
7152 final, Commission Decision of 21 October 2015 on State Aid which Luxembourg Granted to Fiat, Case 
SA.38375 (2014/C ex 2014/NN), "Fiat", para. 220, and case-law cited, Joined Cases T-778/16 and T-892/16, 
Ireland v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, para. 203. 
426 However, the concept of advantage has raised issues in the context of multinational tax arrangements and 
transfer pricing, for this, see Kyriazis, 2016. 
427 See, inter alia, C(2007) 4297 final, Commission Decision of 25.09.2007 on State aid N715/06, Finland. 
Tax Exemption to Finnvera Oyj, paras. 14-18, Tanskanen, 2013, p. 40-41. 
428 Kerle and Flynn, 2016, p. 350, C-403/10 P, Mediaset v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:533, paras. 64 and 
81. 
429 Kerle and Flynn, 2016, p. 291-292. 
430 See, inter alia, Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 105-126. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 
2016, Section 4.2.1. paras. 74-75 and case-law cited. 
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as market participants as long as it does not hamper the fulfilment of the internal market 
objectives.431 Hence, the definition of aid under Article 107(1) TFEU cannot cover a meas-
ure granted to an undertaking through State resources where it could have obtained the same 
advantage in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions.432 However, this 
test is only applicable when the State acts as a market operator, not when it acts in its capacity 
as a public authority.433  
 
In practise, it is not always unequivocal to classify the actions of the State into one of these 
categories only. With regard to tax measures, it is quite clear that State acts in its capacity as 
a public authority by imposing regulations. However, again, in order to guarantee the effect 
utile of EU law and to ensure that the regulatory technique used is not decisive in the classi-
fication of aid, the CJEU has stated that the fiscal nature of the process used to grant the 
advantage does not mean that the applicability of the market operator test can automatically 
be ruled out. This was the case with regard to a waiver of a tax claim in the context of a 
capital injection into an undertaking of which the State was the sole shareholder, where it 
was considered that the State acted in its capacity as a shareholder.434 Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by AG Mazák, it should remain clear that the fiscal activities of the State are 
undertaken in the exercise of its public authority and cannot by definition be undertaken by 
a private entity.435 Hence, although the discussion on the limits of use of public authority is 
an interesting one, it will not be dwelled on further here. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that there appears to be no room for the consideration of environ-
mental objectives in the assessment of an advantage, as only its effect and economic nature 
matter.436 Nonetheless, Nowag has argued that environmental considerations could be taken 
into account under the market operator test, which is based on assessing the conditions under 
which ‘prudent market investors’ operate. Given the changes in the business environment 
 
431 De Cecco 2013, p. 67. 
432 C-579/16 P, Commission v FIH Holding and FIH Erhversban, ECLI:EU:C:2018:159, para. 45, C-533/12 
P, SNCM and France v Corsica Ferries France, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2142, para. 30, C-124/10 P, Commission v 
EDF, ECLI:EU:C:2012:318, para. 78 and case-law cited.  
433  See, inter alia, C-579/16 P, Commission v FIH Holding and FIH Erhversban, ECLI:EU:C:2018:159, 
para. 55, T-565/08, Corsica Ferries France v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:415, para. 79 and case-law 
cited.  
434 C-124/10 P, Commission v EDF, ECLI:EU:C:2012:318, paras. 32, 44, 91-92, 108. See also Bovis. et. al. 
2016, p. 123-125. 
435 Opinion of AG Mazák in C-124/10 P, Commission v EDF, ECLI:EU:C:2011:676, para. 79. See also o-
pinion of AG Léger in C-280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, E-
CLI:EU:C:2002:188, para. 22. 
436 Schöning and Ziegler, 2018, p. 10, Nowag, 2017, p. 93-94. 
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during the last decade or so, one cannot argue that taking environmental considerations into 
account would render the actions of an investor imprudent. Furthermore, the case-law of the 
CJEU may allow the application of the market operator test to investments with an environ-
mental motive, as long as they are profitable in the short or long run.437 The possibilities for 
shifting to a sustainable market operator test are nevertheless limited, as the key focus is on 
the assessment of the terms of investment, which appear rather identical in environmental 
and non-environmental cases.438 Although interesting, this discussion is not that relevant in 
the context of this dissertation, as the market operator test does not as a rule apply to fiscal 
measures.  
 
4.4. Distortion of competition and effect on trade 
 
The last criterion laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU is the requirement that the measure must 
distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between Member States. These two 
conditions –  distortion of competition and effect on trade – are separate but intertwined and 
thus as a rule considered together.439 They are rather easily met, as in fact no actual effects 
on competition and trade need to be proven by the Commission based on an economic anal-
ysis of the market; it is sufficient to show that the measure is liable to have such effects.440 
This is the case when the measure may improve the competitive position of the recipient 
undertaking compared to undertakings with which it competes, which is generally the case 
when the other cumulative criteria are met. As a rule, an economic advantage as defined 
above is itself enough to establish effect on competition, as it relieves undertakings from 
expenses they would otherwise have to bear.441 For instance, the marginal costs of an elec-
tricity undertaking are reduced when it is exempted from paying energy consumption taxes, 
which affects the competitive balance in the market and is likely to change the behaviour of 
the recipient undertaking by providing it an incentive to produce more (green) electricity.442  
 
437 Nowag, 2017, p. 97-98. See also Kingston, 2012, p. 381-382.  
438 Nowag, 2017, p. 99. However, Nowag points out that sustainability-minded investors may consider the 
viability of the terms of investment differently than non-sustainability-minded ones. 
439 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 151. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 6.1. 
para. 186 and case-law cited. 
440 C-659/17, Azienda Napoletana Mobilità, ECLI:EU:C:2019:633, para. 29, C-128/16 P, Commission v 
Spain and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, para. 86, C-211/15 P, Orange v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:798, para. 64, C-672/13, OTP Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2015:185, para. 54 and case-law cited. 
441 C-128/16 P, Commission v Spain and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, para. 84, C-211/15 P, Orange v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:798, para. 66 and case-law cited. See also Commission Notice on the Notion 
of State Aid, 2016, Section 6.2. paras 187, 189. 
442 Verouden and Stehman, 2016, p. 37. 
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With regard to trade between Member States, it is as a rule considered to be affected when 
the measure in question strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other un-
dertakings competing in intra-EU trade.443 However, the criterion may also be met in cases 
where there is no cross-border trade, as the local or regional nature of the targeted activity 
does not exclude the possibility that trade between Member States is affected.444 In these 
cases, the focus is more on market access, where the language used by the CJEU is some-
times similar to the one used when assessing restrictions on fundamental freedoms.445 In this 
connection, it is not necessary that the beneficiary undertaking participates in intra-EU trade, 
as the measure in question may nevertheless help it to pursue its domestic activities, due to 
which undertakings established in other Member States may have less chance of penetrating 
the market of the Member State concerned. In addition, it may place the recipient undertak-
ing in a position which enables it to penetrate the market of another Member State.446  
 
It appears established case-law that aid in the form of a tax relief is most likely to have an 
effect on trade between Member States where taxable persons perform an economic activity 
in the field of such trade or it is conceivable that they are in competition with undertakings 
established in other Member States.447 In general, these conditions are satisfied.448 In any 
case, it is difficult to show that effects on trade and competition would not suffice in the case 
of an existence of a selective advantage, as it establishes a strong presumption of at least a 
risk of such effects. Furthermore, the capacity of the measure to strengthen the recipient’s 
competitive position is assessed by reference to the advantage given, not by the operating 
results of its competitors.449 This reasoning based on a presumption is applied by the CJEU 
and the Commission in cases where an advantage is granted in a liberalised market.450 The 
only clear scenario where competition and trade are considered unaffected is when the meas-
ure falls within the scope of the de Minimis Regulation. 
 
443 C-518/13, Eventech, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, para. 66, C-53/00, Ferring, ECLI:EU:C:2001:627, para. 21 and 
case-law cited. 
444 C-280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, ECLI:EU:C:2003:415, para. 77. 
445 See, for instance, C-148/04, Unicredito Italiano, ECLI:EU:C:2005:774, paras. 58, 62, compare with C-
322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband, ECLI:EU:C:2003:664, para. 72. 
446 C-672/13, OTP Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2015:185, para. 56, C-148/04, Unicredito Italiano, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:774, para. 58. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 6.3. 
para. 192. 
447 C-128/16 P, Commission v Spain and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, para. 85 and case-law cited. 
448 Opinion of AG Kokott in C-66/14, Finanzamt Linz, ECLI:EU:C:2015:242, para. 114. See also Peters, 
2019, p. 12. 
449 T-818/14, BSCA v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:33, para. 211 and case-law cited. 
450 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 152. See also Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 6.2. 
para. 187. 
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However, it appears that the Commission is willing to consider a stricter application of the 
condition, as it has expressly stated in its Notice from year 2016 that an effect on trade cannot 
be merely presumed, but it must be established based on the foreseeable effects of the meas-
ure.451 Accordingly, a measure could be considered not to effect trade between Member 
States when the beneficiaries supply goods or services locally in a manner which is unlikely 
to attract customers or investors from other Member States.452 Hence, also a fiscal measure 
satisfying these conditions could exceptionally escape State aid control, however, its practi-
cal scope of application appears limited.453 Indeed, the focus on macro level instead of micro 
level analysis appears to be more in line with the logic of State aid policy, which aims to 
prevent harmful State intervention in the first place.454  
 
Regardless, it has been argued that a more throughout economic examination of whether 
competition is in fact distorted could provide room for environmental integration. Nowag 
points out that a clear separation between the condition of selectivity and effect on competi-
tion and trade would better respect the division between State aid control under Article 
107(1) TFEU and justification under Article 107(3) TFEU. In addition, it could reduce the 
workload of the Commission as measures not affecting competition would not need to be 
notified under Article 108(3) TFEU. When assessing whether aid for the protection of envi-
ronment is justified under Article 107(3)(c), the Commission applies the guidance provided 
for in the EEAG. Nowag suggests that the conditions therein could be applied already when 
classifying the measure as aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. Hence, when an aid measure is 
proportionate and satisfies the conditions laid down therein, it could be considered as not 
affecting competition and trade when the beneficiaries have been chosen in a transparent, 
non-discriminatory and open manner, and the aid is granted to all undertakings operating in 
the relevant market.455  
 
This would mean that the Commission would possibly have to undertake a similar economic 
analysis than the one under Article 101 and 102 TFEU, which Nowag considers to be in line 
with the ‘more economic approach’ of EU competition and State aid law. He argues that 
under this approach, competition would not be affected if the State merely formulates 
 
451 Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 6.3. para. 195.  
452 Ibid., Section 6.3. para. 197. 
453 Bovis et. al., 2016, p. 157-158. 
454 De Cecco, 2013, p. 43. 
455 Nowag, 2017, p. 113-114. See also EEAG Section 3.2.6.2. paras. 98-99. 
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abstract environmental targets a transparent, non-discriminatory and open manner, and 
leaves it for the discretion of undertakings to decide whether and how to achieve them.456 It 
may however be questioned whether these scenarios should already be falling outside the 
scope of State aid control, as general policy formulations do not entail a transfer of State 
resources. Nowag also considers that under this logic, measures which do not affect product 
or production diversity and address environmental considerations in a cost-effective way, 
should fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, which would apply to measures which 
are needed to create a new market for environmental reasons, as competition cannot be af-
fected when a market does not yet exist.457 However, he does not provide any practical ex-
amples of what such measures could be.  
 
Although worth further consideration, there are difficulties in the application of the ‘more 
economic approach’ as already mentioned above. Of course, the application of the assess-
ment methods applied in the context of Articles 101-102 TFEU is a possibility, but the ques-
tion becomes, again, whether the methods of another field of EU law can be applied to State 
aid law as such due to its distinctive nature. Micheau discusses the criticisms with this re-
spect and points out that it is debatable whether State aid law is meant to regulate competition 
between undertakings as such or whether it governs competition between Member States, 
and considers that it should not be viewed as a mere antitrust instrument. Therefore, it should 
not be assessed with regard to competitors operating in a relevant market, either.458 Be it as 
it may, such a distinction is difficult to establish in practice, as the both types of competition 
are interwoven with each other.459 
 
The practical difficulties arise from the fact that it is not straightforward to identify those 
affected by a tax measure since it can influence the same market or any related market in the 
internal market. However, due to the vague concept of distortion of competition, the more-
economic approach could provide a means to curb State aid control.460 On the other hand, as 
Peters point out quite convincingly, the broad notion of distortion of competition gives rise 
to too many uncertainties which render it an insufficient tool for the allocation of powers 
 
456 Nowag, 2017, p. 114. 
457 Nowag, 2017, p. 114. 
458 Micheau, 2015, p. 346-347. 
459 Peters, 2019, p. 12. 
460 Micheau, 2015, p. 346-348.  
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between the Member States and the Commission.461 To me, the approach applied by the 
Commission today, where it expressly identifies certain scenarios as not having an effect on 
trade appears the most feasible option.462 This is because already the wording of Article 
107(1) TFEU necessitates only a potential distortion of competition, and it is difficult to 
show that such a risk would not exist once the other three conditions are fulfilled. Hence, I 
adhere to the view of many others according to which selectivity is decisive criterion in the 
classification of a measure as State aid at least when it comes to fiscal aid for environmental 
purposes. 
  
 
461 Peters, 2019, p. 12-13. 
462 With this respect, see Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid, 2016, Section 6.3. para. 197. 
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5. JUSTIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 107(3)(c) TFEU  
 
For the purposes of providing a comprehensive overview of the topic of this dissertation, the 
justification of the measure classified as prohibited State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU 
cannot be ignored. There are, however, a few reasons why this section will not be subject to 
a throughout review. First, the EEAG provide detailed guidance with respect to which types 
of measures may be justified, that is, considered compatible with the internal market. Due to 
the mere length of the guidance and the several references to instruments of secondary law 
entailed therein, it is not possible to engage in academic discussion which would be profound 
enough considering the limited space available. Furthermore, such a discussion is not of so 
much interest due to the particularity of the guidance, and the fact that the currently applica-
ble EEAG will be replaced in year 2022463, due to which the discussion on its interpretation 
and shortcomings will soon be outdated.  
 
Article 107(3) TFEU lays down several derogations from the general prohibition of State 
aid. As Article 107(3)(c) TFEU is most often invoked in the case of aid for environmental 
purposes, it will be the focus of this section. However, sometimes Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, 
which provides for a derogation on account of the promotion of a project of common Euro-
pean interest may also be invoked in the context of environmental measures. The question 
of whether this article bears some untapped potential with regard to the justification of aid 
for the purposes of pursuing the emissions reductions targets in particular is interesting but 
will not be dwelled on further due to the limited space.464 
 
5.1. Compatibility with the internal market – the EEAG 
 
According to Article 107(3)(c), aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activi-
ties or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions 
to an extent contrary to the common interest, may be considered compatible with the internal 
market. The main criteria for a measure to be considered compatible are 1) contribution to a 
well-defined objective of common interest and a need for State intervention, 2) 
 
463 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_182. See also Communication from the 
Commission concerning the prolongation and the amendments of, inter alia, the Guidelines on State Aid for 
Environmental Protection and Energy 2014-2020, OJ C 224, 8.7.2020, p. 2–4.  
464 For more discussion on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, see Nowag, 2017, p. 186-191. 
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proportionality465, appropriateness and transparency of the measure, 3) the avoidance of un-
due negative effects on competition and trade, and 4) an incentive effect which steers the 
behaviour of undertakings towards the achievement of the environmental objective in ques-
tion in a manner which they would not have undertaken in the absence of aid.466 The general 
aim is to ensure that the positive effects of the measure towards environmental protection 
exceed its potential negative effects on trade and competition to an extent which would be 
contrary to common interest.467 With regard to the appropriateness of an aid measure as a 
policy instrument, the Commission maintains that adherence to the PPP via EU or national 
law is the main method for rectifying market failures linked to negative externalities.468 
However, State aid may play a role in the implementation of the applicable law (for instance 
via tax exemptions) or in the absence of laws regulating the issue in question.469 
 
As Nowag explains, the EEAG is characterised by two tests which are used as tools for the 
reconciliation of environmental protection and competition: the requirement of an incentive 
effect and the PPP. The requirement of an incentive guarantees the necessity of the aid in 
order to minimise distortions of competition, whereas the PPP is used as a tool for the as-
sessment of appropriateness of the measure for the attainment of the environmental objec-
tive in question. Whenever an aid measure addresses a negative externality it supports the 
implementation of the PPP, but also measures given to non-polluting undertakings to en-
courage environmentally friendly action may be in line with the principle. Furthermore, 
when a measure is given in order to reach an objective beyond the standards laid down at 
EU level, the PPP is not breached because the applicable EU law does not require the polluter 
to pay for that pollution. Finally, there are some cases where the PPP is breached but the aid 
measure may nevertheless be justified on grounds of the importance of the overall aim of 
the system. Examples of such measures as identified by Nowag include exemptions and re-
ductions from environmental taxes, as they may be necessary in order to introduce the system 
of environmental taxation in the first place.470 Instead, environmental taxes which increase 
the costs of production of undertakings who are creating negative externalities are always in 
line with the PPP. In fact, all measures which favour environmentally friendly products or 
 
465 In general, proportionality necessitates that the amount of aid is limited to the minimum needed to achieve 
the objective in question. See EEAG, Section 3.2.5.1. para. 69. 
466 See EEAG, Section 3.1. para. 27. 
467 EEAG, Section 3.1. para. 26. See also Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 88. 
468 EEAG, Section 3.2.3.1. para. 44. 
469 Ibid., Nowag, 2017, p. 194-195. 
470 Nowag, 2017, p. 199-200. 
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activity at the expense of more polluting ones are not to be viewed as an undue distortion of 
competition as such, since they are inherently linked to the objective of the aid of making 
the economy greener.471 
 
With regard reductions in or exemptions from environmental taxes, the Commission 
acknowledges that they may in fact adversely affect the objective of protection of the envi-
ronment, due to which it is required that the overall objective of the environmental tax to 
discourage environmentally harmful behaviour must not be undermined in order for the 
measure to be justified. Furthermore, tax reductions must be necessary and based on objec-
tive, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, and the undertakings concerned must con-
tribute towards increasing environmental protection.472  
 
The Commission considers that tax reductions do not undermine the environmental objective 
pursued and contribute at least indirectly to an increased level of environmental protection, 
if the Member State concerned can demonstrate that 1) they are well targeted to undertakings 
being mostly affected by a higher tax, and 2) that the higher tax rate is generally applicable 
than would be the case without the exemption.473 The Commission may apply a simplified 
approach in the case of harmonised environmental taxes, whereas its assessment is more in 
depth in terms of non-harmonised taxes, with respect to which it has defined detailed condi-
tions for establishing both necessity and proportionality.474 However, it has been questioned 
whether these conditions are sufficient for guaranteeing that there actually is an increase in 
environmental protection. For instance, the specified proportionality condition leaves a con-
siderable leeway to the Members States by establishing a maximum reduction of 80% from 
the applicable environmental tax, regardless of the level of increase in environmental pro-
tection.475 The fact that an undertaking may suffer loss of competitiveness from bearing the 
full tax does not necessarily show that it needs a reduction up to such a high limit.476 Fur-
thermore, the presumed positive (indirect) impact of the reduction on the environment does 
not need to be demonstrated477, which is unsatisfactory in terms of the integration principle 
and the objectives of environmental protection as laid down in the Treaties. As Nicolaides 
 
471 EEAG, Section 3.2.6.1. para. 90, Nowag, 2017, p. 201. 
472 EEAG, Section 3.7.1. paras. 167-168. 
473 Ibid., para. 170. 
474 Ibid., paras. 172, 177-178. 
475 Maillo, 2017, p. 9. 
476 Nicolaides, 2015, p. 573. 
477 Ibid., p. 574. 
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notes, the logic of the justification of reductions from environmental taxes appears more 
industrial than environmental by nature.478  
 
Wiesbrock argues in line with several other scholars479 that Article 11 TFEU in conjunction 
with Article 3 TEU and the principle of sustainable development does not only require that 
objectives of environmental protection must be taken into account in this balancing exercise, 
but that they should in fact be prioritised to the extent that economic and social objectives 
are pursued within the ecological limits of the planet.480 She notes that the EEAG includes 
exemptions which in fact serve neither environmental nor economic purposes and appear to 
breach the integration principle, such as exemptions for energy-intensive industries in order 
to maintain their international competitiveness.481 The fact that the Commission aims at com-
petitive and climate neutral economy482 with this respect may prove to be in line with the 
principle of integration but may also imply that economic considerations continue to set the 
benchmark against which other objectives are reconciled with. Wiesbrock also considers that 
the EEAG should be drafted in a more flexible manner instead of trying to identify each 
particular type of aid that may be acceptable.483 Requiring adherence to the main assessment 
principles explained above could in my opinion be sufficient and allow the Member States 
more freedom in the pursuit of their respective policy objectives within their economic and 
technological resources. With regard to tax exemptions and reductions, it is important that 
they remain subject to strict scrutiny and that the Commission should require that in order to 
be justified, they must verifiably contribute towards increasing the objective environmental 
protection. 
 
5.2. Justification of aid measures the objective of which is not environmental  
 
Finally, the question of justification of aid measures whose objective is not environmental 
under Article 107(3)(c) deserves a closer look – is the Commission required to take the pos-
sibly harmful effects on the environment resulting from these measures into account in its 
 
478 Ibid., p. 578. 
479 Such, inter alia, Voigt, 2015, p. 45, 50, Sjåfell, 2015, p. 53, 56, Lafferty and Hovden, 2003, p. 10-12, 15. 
480 Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 87. See also De Sadeleer, 2014, p. 24-25, according to whom at least the protection 
of key natural resources and endangered or rare species as well as the prevention of irreversible damage 
should never be overridden by other policy objectives. 
481 Ibid. p. 91-92. 
482 See Communication from the Commission, A Clean Planet for all: A European strategic long-term vision 
for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy, COM(2018) 773 final. 
483 Wiesbrock, 2015, p. 92.  
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assessment? In the light of the recent case-law of the GC, this appears not to be the case. A 
prominent case with this respect is the judgement of the GC in case Hinkley Point C briefly 
mentioned above. The case concerned aid to a new nuclear power station in the UK meant 
to 1) ensure price stability for electricity sales during its operational period, 2) guarantee 
compensatory measures to investors in case of an early shutdown on political grounds, and 
3) provide a credit guarantee.484 One statement of the GC in this case was that an objective 
of common interest as understood under Article 107(3)(c) does not need to be one shared by 
all or the majority of Member States, due to which the UK was entitled to decide that the 
development of nuclear energy was in its public interest.485  
 
Aid measures the objective of which is not environmental, but relates to considerations of 
energy policy for instance, are not subject to assessment under EEAG and need not to com-
ply with the requirement of environmental protection. This was expressly stated by the GC, 
as a response to the argument of Republic of Austria according to which the Commission 
had ignored the potential negative effects of the aid on the environment such as those result-
ing from the storing of nuclear waste in its balancing assessment. It stated that “[I] in the 
context of the application of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the Commission must weigh up the 
advantages of the measures at issue and their negative impact on the internal market. Alt-
hough protection of the environment must be integrated into the definition and implementa-
tion of EU policies, particularly those which have the aim of establishing the internal market, 
it does not constitute, per se, one of the components of that internal market, defined as an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured. Consequently, when identifying the negative effects of the measures at 
issue, the Commission was not obliged to take into account the extent to which the measures 
at issue are detrimental to the implementation of that principle. That applies equally to the 
precautionary principle, the ‘polluter pays’ principle and the sustainability principle.”486 
The GC also emphasised the ancillary nature of environmental principles by stating that “[I]t 
should be noted that, apart from the principle of protection of the environment, the precau-
tionary principle, the ‘polluter pays’ principle and the principle of sustainability, those 
Member States do not invoke any EU environmental legislation that may not have been com-
plied with.” 487  
 
484 T-356/15, Austria v Commission, 2018, EU:T:2018:439. 
485 Ibid, paras. 84-88, 95. 
486 T-356/15, Austria v Commission, 2018, EU:T:2018:439, para. 516. 
487 Ibid., para. 517. 
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The GC had already stated similarly in its landmark ruling in case Castelnou Energía v Com-
mission, where it stated that when assessing an aid measure which does not pursue an envi-
ronmental objective, the Commission is not required to take account of environmental 
rules.488 The reasoning of the GC appears somewhat circular. How can it be deduced from 
the fact that 1) the protection of the environment must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of EU policies, particularly those which have the aim of establishing the 
internal market that 2) protection of the environment does not however constitute one of the 
components of that internal market per se, due to which 3) concerns related to the protection 
of the environment need not the be taken into account when assessing negative effects on 
the internal market? To me, the logical argument would be that negative environmental ef-
fects cannot render a State aid measure incompatible with the internal market as such, not 
that the considerations of environmental objectives should be excluded in non-environmen-
tal cases, which runs quite contrary to the meaning of Article 11 TFEU. 
 
Perhaps what the GC appears to say is that Article 107(3)(c) does not preclude compatible 
aid from having negative effects on other objectives, which is in line with the nature of State 
aid policy. However, this should not justify the exclusion of considerations of those objec-
tives in the context of the balancing assessment. For instance, the sustainability of the meas-
ure could be one factor to be considered – if the measure could not attain its objectives sus-
tainably, it would be considered as a negative effect which would need to be outweighed by 
the positive economic or social effects in question.489 Furthermore, as Nowag points out, the 
line of reasoning applied by the GC in these cases is not only in conflict with Article 11 
TFEU, 26(2) TFEU and 2-3 TEU, but also with the previous case-law of the ECJ490, who 
has stated that the application of State aid rules ‘must never produce a result which is con-
trary to the specific provisions of the Treaty. Accordingly, State aid, certain conditions of 
which contravene other provisions of the Treaty, cannot be declared by the Commission to 
be compatible with the [internal] market’.491 The ruling in Hinkley Point C is subject to 
appeal492, and it remains to be seen whether the ECJ reinforces the exclusion of the 
 
488 T-57/11, Castelnou Energía v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021, paras. 189-191. 
489 See by analogy, opinion of AG Kokott in C-43/10, Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and Oth-
ers, ECLI:EU:C:2011:651, para. 238. 
490 Nowag, 2017, p. 267-268. 
491 C-390/06, Nuova Agricast, ECLI:EU:C:2008:224, para. 50 and case-law cited. 
492 C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, not yet reported. 
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consideration of environmental principles and obligations laid down in the Treaties in the 
assessment of measures whose objective is not related to the protection of the environment. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS   
 
Finally, it is time to summarise the main findings of this dissertation by answering to the 
questioned presented. It has been pointed out that EU-wide State aid control limits the Mem-
ber States’ freedom to implement their environmental and fiscal policies, and thus also the 
means by which they may aim to attain the climate policy targets imposed by binding EU 
and national law. It has been acknowledged that the utilisation of State aid is on the increase, 
and aid for protection of the environment and energy savings appears to cover over half of 
the total spending as of 2018. Although State intervention in the market should continue to 
be allowed only when it contributes to a well-defined environmental objective by addressing 
a particular negative externality or by incentivising desired behaviour, it has been argued 
that more flexibility in the assessment of the cumulative criteria may be called for in the 
future in order for the State aid regime to better align with the requirements of Article 11 
TFEU and environmental law. When it comes to fiscal aid measures, the increasing activism 
of the Commission has raised a scholarly debate on the desired scope of State aid control, 
and it may be argued that especially the notion of material selectivity plays a crucial role in 
the division of competences between the Member States and the EU with this respect. 
 
It may be concluded from Chapter 2 that efficiency considerations have gained a strong 
stance in EU competition policy, but the consideration of environmental objectives in State 
aid law cannot be excluded on account of adherence to a specific competition theory. In fact, 
there are several arguments based on EU primary law which support the integration of EU 
competition and environmental policy. This is especially true in terms of State aid law, which 
is characterised by the balancing of public and private interests. It was pointed out that the 
protection of the environment constitutes an essential objective of the EU and the objectives 
stemming from Article 3(3) TEU and Articles 191(1)-(2) TFEU must be reconciled with 
other provisions of EU primary law. The PPP already plays a prominent role in the assess-
ment of aid in the form of environmental taxes and exemptions therefrom, but the standing 
of environmental considerations in the assessment of State aid has otherwise remained lim-
ited. This is above all due to the so-called effects-based approach, which excludes to consid-
eration of the objectives of the measure in the assessment under Article 107(1) TFEU.  
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However, Article 11 TFEU imposes a concrete obligation to integrate environmental protec-
tion requirements into the definition and implementation of EU policies and activities at all 
stages of decision-making processes in line with the principle of sustainable development. 
This justifies and even requires the consideration of environmental objectives both in the 
assessment of the cumulative criteria under Article 107(1) TFEU and in the assessment of 
compatibility under Article 107(3) TFEU. Sustainable development necessitates the balanc-
ing of economic, social and environmental objectives, and although no objective as such is 
to be given priority, there are sound arguments according to which the ecological limits of 
the planet are the precondition of sustainability which should not be compromised. It was 
concluded that environmental considerations could be integrated into EU State aid law in a 
more comprehensive manner. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the rationale of environmental taxation, which is considered as an effi-
cient tool for the attainment of public policy objectives and as one of the preferred instru-
ments for addressing climate change. Attention was given to the prevailing issues concerning 
the definition of an environmental tax, due to which some fiscal measures which are not 
always capable of promoting environmental protection per se are nevertheless considered 
under the rules for aid for environmental protection. This is particularly the case with aid in 
the form of reductions in or exemptions from environmental taxes, whose permissibility 
must be assessed carefully in order to ensure that they contribute to a higher level of envi-
ronmental protection at least indirectly while serving other legitimate interests such as main-
taining competitiveness. In addition, an overview of the scenarios where Article 107(1) 
TFEU does not apply was given, with the conclusion that the applicable framework for fiscal 
State aid in the field of environment is complex and not void of inconsistencies. The scat-
tered framework for permissible aid poses issues of legal certainty for national legislators as 
well as increases the administrative burden of both the Member States and the Commission. 
 
The core matter of this dissertation – the standing of environmental objectives in the assess-
ment of the cumulative criteria for fiscal State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU – was studied 
in Chapter 4. It was observed that environmental objectives already play a role in this as-
sessment to some extent. As a rule, the criteria of State resources and imputability to State 
are satisfied in the case of fiscal measures, as their link with State budget and the use of 
public authority is apparent. The criteria of an economic advantage and effect on competition 
and trade are likewise rarely disputed in these cases. Instead, the notion of material 
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selectivity and the three-step test used for its determination have been subject to debate, and 
the application of the test also entails most room for the integration of environmental objec-
tives in the assessment of fiscal State aid. It was observed that the standing of environmental 
objectives in the assessment of material selectivity appeared weak for several years as a 
result of rulings such as British Aggregates and NOx, and the ECJ seemed reluctant to accept 
their consideration as suggested by the GC. It however appears that both the ECJ and the 
Commission are now shifting towards a slightly more flexible approach and thus departing 
from a strict adherence to the effects-based approach. This would be welcomed, as economic 
efficiency considerations should be balanced against the democratically decided public pol-
icy objectives of the Member States.493 
 
When it comes to the application of the three-step test, the reference framework as defined 
by the national legislators should be the starting point, as they are free to spread the tax 
burden as they see fit and opt for a tax criterion connected with a particular base or activity 
in the absence of EU rules. The reference framework may be the regulation or the general 
scheme of taxation of which the measure forms a part or the measure itself, and the scope 
for the consideration of environmental objectives differs depending on how it is defined. The 
narrower the reference framework, the more likely it may be considered to entail objectives 
special to it which may be taken into account in the assessment. Currently, the consideration 
of environmental objectives is expressly allowed when the reference framework may be 
characterised as a special-purpose levy. This is the case when the structure of the tax is spe-
cifically designed to attain an environmental objective by either earmarking its revenue for 
a concrete environmental objective or by designing it in a manner which has a desired in-
centive effect. If it is applied to all undertakings in a comparable and factual situation in the 
light of the objective in question, it should escape State aid control. 
 
The prevailing rule of interpretation is that difference in treatment means that undertakings 
in a comparable and factual situation are treated in a manner which may be characterised as 
discriminatory. Therefore, different treatment of undertakings may be allowed when their 
activities have different impact on the environmental objective pursued. In line with recent 
rulings of the ECJ such as Kernkraftwerke, ANGED and UNESA, environmental objectives 
of the measure may be the factor against which comparability of undertakings is assessed, 
 
493 Chari et. al., 2016, p. 7-8. 
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at least when the reference framework is the measure itself. Hence, when the reference 
framework is determined carefully and structure of the measure is designed in a manner 
which links it with the environmental objective in question and addresses all undertakings 
in a comparable and factual situation in the light of that objective, the measure should not 
constitute State aid. When it comes to the final step of the three-step test, it appears to leave 
least room for environmental integration, as environmental objectives appear not to qualify 
as justifications arising from the nature or general structure of the system. In addition, the 
burden of proof for this step is on the Member States. However, it cannot be excluded that 
environmental considerations could never be considered as guiding principles of the tax sys-
tem, if it is drafted in a manner which closely links its structure with specific environmental 
objectives. Nevertheless, currently the classification as prohibited State aid may best be 
avoided by carefully planning well-targeted fiscal measures addressing particular negative 
externalities arising from particular actions. Instead, derogations from general systems on 
grounds of environmental objectives are most likely considered selective. 
 
After studying the current application of the three-step test, the diverse viewpoints of aca-
demics on the possible need to alter the interpretation of the cumulative criteria to better 
respect the integration principle laid down in Article 11 TFEU as well as to strike a balance 
between safeguarding competition and the competences of the Member States were dis-
cussed. It was contemplated whether the alternative approaches, such as the objectives-based 
approach, would prove difficult to apply in practise on account of concerns of legal certainty 
and the fact that they often base themselves on the principles of other areas of EU law, mainly 
free movement or antitrust law, neither of which share the specific objectives and character-
istics of State aid law. Hence, the author of this dissertation leans towards those approaches 
which are built upon the existing State aid regime. In line with Wiesbrock and Nowag, the 
application of Article 11 TFEU in the assessment of aid under Article 107(1) TFEU would 
mean that measures such as general exemptions from environmental taxes could fall outside 
the scope of prohibited aid when they are generally available across sectors in line with 
objective and predefined conditions. Instead, whenever a State measure relieves an under-
taking from the costs it would normally have to bear under the applicable legal framework 
for environmental protection, a selective advantage is conferred. This approach emphasises 
two points: 1) environmental objectives as such are not sufficient to exclude a measure from 
State aid control, but 2) when the measure addresses a particular negative externality stem-
ming from a particular activity and all undertakings engaged in that activity in a consistent 
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manner (consistency test), it is in line with the PPP and should therefore escape State aid 
control.  
 
Hence, balancing ex post should only occur if integration ex ante is not possible. Adherence 
to the PPP and Article 11 TFEU should also mean that aid measures which are notified as 
aid for the protection of the environment but nevertheless pose a threat to it are prohibited 
even if they would comply with the requirements of competition law. On the other hand, aid 
measures which verifiably promote the protection of the environment should be more easily 
approved regardless of their anti-competitive effects, if they remain proportional. This ap-
proach could lessen the administrative burden of the Member States and the Commission as 
only one assessment under Article 107(1) TFEU would suffice in more cases instead of hav-
ing to undertake the compatibility assessment under Article 107(3) TFEU afterwards, too. 
However, due to the risk of circumventing the application of State aid rules, each case should 
nevertheless be evaluated carefully in order to ensure that the measure pursues a genuine 
objective of environmental policy in a consistent and non-selective manner. 
 
Finally, the logic of the EEAG as well as some inconsistencies with Article 11 TFEU and 
the aim of environmental protection contained therein were discussed in Chapter 5, such as 
the fact that it allows significant reductions from the applicable environmental tax without 
requiring a demonstration of its positive indirect impact on the environment. It was also 
wondered whether the EEAG could be drafted in a more general manner instead of trying to 
identify each particular type of aid that may be acceptable. Requiring adherence to the main 
assessment principles could prove sufficient for safeguarding the objectives of State aid con-
trol while allowing the Member States more freedom in the pursuit of their respective policy 
objectives in accordance with their national circumstances. In addition, it was argued that 
proper integration of Article 11 TFEU would necessitate taking environmental considera-
tions into account in the compatibility assessment of aid measures which are not notified as 
aid for the protection of the environment. A negative effect on the environment could be 
considered as a negative effect on the internal market which would need to be outweighed 
by the positive economic or social effects of the aid measure in question. 
